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The Foundations of Foundationalism
Noûs, 1980There is a controversy in contemporary philosophy over the question whether or not knowledge must have a foundation.1 On one side are the foundationalists, who do accept the metaphor and find the foundation in sensory experience or the like. The coherentists, on the other side, reject the foundations metaphor and consider our body of knowledge a ...
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Relativism and Foundationalism
Monist, 1984Various issues are characteristically associated with discussions about relativism. The first concerns defining relativism?which is not an easy mat ter, since there seems to be no clear and well established usage to which one might appeal. Some stipulation is required, though this need not be ar bitrary.
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Foundationalism and Coherentism
2018This chapter examines two classic responses to the epistemic regress problem: foundationalism and coherentism. Foundationalists seek to avoid the regress by invoking the non-inferential justification of basic beliefs, while coherentists do so by introducing a non-linear conception of justification. While both of these positions focus on the possibility
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1994
Abstract We can say, then, that for Wittgenstein the applicability of doubt is one of the features that defines the language game. This is a complex thought with many ramifications. One is that where doubt is inapplicable we are dealing with matters that do not belong to the language game.
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Abstract We can say, then, that for Wittgenstein the applicability of doubt is one of the features that defines the language game. This is a complex thought with many ramifications. One is that where doubt is inapplicable we are dealing with matters that do not belong to the language game.
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FOUNDATIONALISM AND ARBITRARINESS
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2005: Nonskeptical foundationalists say that there are basic beliefs. But, one might object, either there is a reason why basic beliefs are likely to be true or there is not. If there is, then they are not basic; if there is not, then they are arbitrary. I argue that this dilemma is not nearly as decisive as its author, Peter Klein, would have us believe.
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Hermeneutics as a … Foundationalism?
Dialogue, 2006ABSTRACTIt is commonly assumed, at least by continental philosophers, that epistemological hermeneutics and foundationalism are incompatible. I argue that this assumption is mistaken. If I am correct, the analytic and continental traditions may be closer than is commonly supposed.
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Foundationalism and Intuitionism
1996Abstract As Brink recognizes, if his theory is purely inferential it must follow that “no beliefs are noninferentially justified.” Moreover, he explicitly recognizes that it follows from this that no beliefs can be self-justifying, for then some would not be inferentially justified.1 In this section (7.1) I argue that plausible ...
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