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Foundationalism and Coherentism Reconsidered
Erkenntnis, 1998Etude du debat sur le fondationnalisme et le coherentisme, le naturalisme et l'anti-naturalisme, opposant M. Schlick et O. Neurath, puis W. V. Quine et D. Davidson. Examinant la defense de Quine developpee par R. Gibson contre Davidson, et examinant la fonction explicative de l'empathie recemment determinee par Quine, l'A.
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1994
Abstract Foundationalist theories of justification attempt to solve the Agrippa problem by finding some way of bringing the infinite regress of reasons to a nonarbitrary halt. This chapter concentrates on Chisholm's attempt to do this. Such a theory faces a double task: the first is to find suitable starting points that do not themselves
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Abstract Foundationalist theories of justification attempt to solve the Agrippa problem by finding some way of bringing the infinite regress of reasons to a nonarbitrary halt. This chapter concentrates on Chisholm's attempt to do this. Such a theory faces a double task: the first is to find suitable starting points that do not themselves
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Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 1982
Epistemological foundationalism has typically been thought to hold that in order to account for human knowledge we must countenance the direct Justification of some specific kind of beliefs, such as one's beliefs to the effect that one is having a certain sensation.
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Epistemological foundationalism has typically been thought to hold that in order to account for human knowledge we must countenance the direct Justification of some specific kind of beliefs, such as one's beliefs to the effect that one is having a certain sensation.
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The Foundations of Foundationalism
Noûs, 1980There is a controversy in contemporary philosophy over the question whether or not knowledge must have a foundation.1 On one side are the foundationalists, who do accept the metaphor and find the foundation in sensory experience or the like. The coherentists, on the other side, reject the foundations metaphor and consider our body of knowledge a ...
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Relativism and Foundationalism
Monist, 1984Various issues are characteristically associated with discussions about relativism. The first concerns defining relativism?which is not an easy mat ter, since there seems to be no clear and well established usage to which one might appeal. Some stipulation is required, though this need not be ar bitrary.
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Foundationalism and Coherentism
2018This chapter examines two classic responses to the epistemic regress problem: foundationalism and coherentism. Foundationalists seek to avoid the regress by invoking the non-inferential justification of basic beliefs, while coherentists do so by introducing a non-linear conception of justification. While both of these positions focus on the possibility
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1994
Abstract We can say, then, that for Wittgenstein the applicability of doubt is one of the features that defines the language game. This is a complex thought with many ramifications. One is that where doubt is inapplicable we are dealing with matters that do not belong to the language game.
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Abstract We can say, then, that for Wittgenstein the applicability of doubt is one of the features that defines the language game. This is a complex thought with many ramifications. One is that where doubt is inapplicable we are dealing with matters that do not belong to the language game.
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New Blackfriars, 1990
Both the ‘coherentist’ and the ‘foundationalist’ theories of the justification of our claims to empirical knowledge are subject to considerable difficulty, as Laurence BonJour admirably brings out in his book The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. (Coherentism is the view that justification of a proposition is always and exclusively a matter of its ...
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Both the ‘coherentist’ and the ‘foundationalist’ theories of the justification of our claims to empirical knowledge are subject to considerable difficulty, as Laurence BonJour admirably brings out in his book The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. (Coherentism is the view that justification of a proposition is always and exclusively a matter of its ...
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FOUNDATIONALISM AND ARBITRARINESS
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2005: Nonskeptical foundationalists say that there are basic beliefs. But, one might object, either there is a reason why basic beliefs are likely to be true or there is not. If there is, then they are not basic; if there is not, then they are arbitrary. I argue that this dilemma is not nearly as decisive as its author, Peter Klein, would have us believe.
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