Results 131 to 140 of about 198 (158)
Some of the next articles are maybe not open access.
2017
Gettier constructed his well-known examples by assuming two things: (1) that the justification needed to know is the kind one can have for a false proposition; and (2) justificational closure— that justification is transmitted through known implication. I think both assumptions are false.
openaire +1 more source
Gettier constructed his well-known examples by assuming two things: (1) that the justification needed to know is the kind one can have for a false proposition; and (2) justificational closure— that justification is transmitted through known implication. I think both assumptions are false.
openaire +1 more source
2017
Gettiered beliefs are beliefs that fall short of knowledge in the way illustrated by Gettier cases: cases like those Edmund Gettier employed to show that justified true belief doesn’t suffice for knowledge. What has happened to a belief that falls short of knowledge in the way such cases illustrate? I focus initially on two leading substantive answers,
openaire +1 more source
Gettiered beliefs are beliefs that fall short of knowledge in the way illustrated by Gettier cases: cases like those Edmund Gettier employed to show that justified true belief doesn’t suffice for knowledge. What has happened to a belief that falls short of knowledge in the way such cases illustrate? I focus initially on two leading substantive answers,
openaire +1 more source
Synthese, 2016
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
openaire +1 more source
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
openaire +1 more source
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2013
AbstractThis article argues that justified true beliefs in Gettier cases often are not true due to luck. I offer two ‘unlucky’ Gettier cases, and it's easy enough to generate more. Hence even attaching a broad ‘anti‐luck’ codicil to the tripartite account of knowledge leaves the Gettier problem intact. Also, two related questions are addressed.
openaire +1 more source
AbstractThis article argues that justified true beliefs in Gettier cases often are not true due to luck. I offer two ‘unlucky’ Gettier cases, and it's easy enough to generate more. Hence even attaching a broad ‘anti‐luck’ codicil to the tripartite account of knowledge leaves the Gettier problem intact. Also, two related questions are addressed.
openaire +1 more source
2017
This chapter argues that the literature surrounding the Gettier Problem arises from a kind of methodological false consciousness in the epistemology of the middle part of the twentieth century. The underlying methodology is contrasted with two paradigms within the history of epistemology: one prompted by the conversational context of scrapes with the ...
openaire +1 more source
This chapter argues that the literature surrounding the Gettier Problem arises from a kind of methodological false consciousness in the epistemology of the middle part of the twentieth century. The underlying methodology is contrasted with two paradigms within the history of epistemology: one prompted by the conversational context of scrapes with the ...
openaire +1 more source
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 1992
(1992). Gettier and scepticism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 70, No. 3, pp. 277-285.
openaire +1 more source
(1992). Gettier and scepticism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 70, No. 3, pp. 277-285.
openaire +1 more source
1994
AbstractThis chapter examines Gettier's objections to defining knowledge as justified true belief – the so‐called Gettier problems. In response to these objections, a distinction is drawn between two kinds of justification. A person can be justified in coming to believe that p if he has been epistemically responsible in doing so.
openaire +1 more source
AbstractThis chapter examines Gettier's objections to defining knowledge as justified true belief – the so‐called Gettier problems. In response to these objections, a distinction is drawn between two kinds of justification. A person can be justified in coming to believe that p if he has been epistemically responsible in doing so.
openaire +1 more source
Philosophical Psychology, 2013
Previous research in experimental philosophy has suggested that moral judgments can influence the ordinary application of a number of different concepts, including attributions of knowledge. But should epistemologists care? The present set of studies demonstrate that this basic effect can be extended to overturn intuitions in some of the most ...
openaire +1 more source
Previous research in experimental philosophy has suggested that moral judgments can influence the ordinary application of a number of different concepts, including attributions of knowledge. But should epistemologists care? The present set of studies demonstrate that this basic effect can be extended to overturn intuitions in some of the most ...
openaire +1 more source
2018
Gettier cases describe situations where an agent possesses a justified true belief that p, without, at least according to mainstream analytic epistemology, knowing that p, while the “Gettier intuition” is the judgment that a protagonist in a Gettier case does not know the relevant proposition.
Edouard Machery +8 more
openaire +1 more source
Gettier cases describe situations where an agent possesses a justified true belief that p, without, at least according to mainstream analytic epistemology, knowing that p, while the “Gettier intuition” is the judgment that a protagonist in a Gettier case does not know the relevant proposition.
Edouard Machery +8 more
openaire +1 more source
2012
For centuries tradition had it that knowledge is justified true belief. Then Edmund Gettier produced cases that refute that traditional view – or so most philosophers think. I disagree. The widespread intuition lying behind the so-called ‘Gettier Cases’ is that there is epistemic bad luck (we can unluckily fail to know), but no epistemic good luck (we ...
openaire +1 more source
For centuries tradition had it that knowledge is justified true belief. Then Edmund Gettier produced cases that refute that traditional view – or so most philosophers think. I disagree. The widespread intuition lying behind the so-called ‘Gettier Cases’ is that there is epistemic bad luck (we can unluckily fail to know), but no epistemic good luck (we ...
openaire +1 more source