Results 21 to 30 of about 87 (66)

Regularization Inertial Proximal Point Algorithm for Monotone Hemicontinuous Mapping and Inverse Strongly Monotone Mappings in Hilbert Spaces [PDF]

Journal of Inequalities and Applications, 2010
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Nguyen Buong, Jong Kyu Kim
openaire   +5 more sources

Pairwise Stable Matching in Large Economies

Econometrica, Volume 89, Issue 6, Page 2929-2974, November 2021., 2021
We formulate a stability notion for two‐sided pairwise matching problems with individually insignificant agents in distributional form. Matchings are formulated as joint distributions over the characteristics of the populations to be matched. Spaces of characteristics can be high‐dimensional and need not be compact.
Michael Greinecker, Christopher Kah
wiley   +1 more source

Subgame‐perfect equilibrium in games with almost perfect information: Dispensing with public randomization

Theoretical Economics, Volume 16, Issue 4, Page 1221-1248, November 2021., 2021
Harris, Reny, and Robson (1995) added a public randomization device to dynamic games with almost perfect information to ensure existence of subgame perfect equilibria (SPE). We show that when Nature's moves are atomless in the original game, public randomization does not enlarge the set of SPE payoffs: any SPE obtained using public randomization can be
Paulo Barelli, John Duggan
wiley   +1 more source

Renegotiation of long‐term contracts as part of an implicit agreement

Theoretical Economics, Volume 16, Issue 4, Page 1471-1512, November 2021., 2021
I study a repeated principal–agent game with long‐term output contracts that can be renegotiated at will. Actions are observable but not contractible, so they can only be incentivized through implicit agreements formed in equilibrium. I show that contract renegotiation is a powerful tool for incentive provision, despite the stationarity of the ...
Rumen Kostadinov
wiley   +1 more source

Strict pure strategy Nash equilibria in large finite‐player games

Theoretical Economics, Volume 16, Issue 3, Page 1055-1093, July 2021., 2021
In the context of anonymous games (i.e., games where the payoff of a player is, apart from his/her own action, determined by the distribution of the actions made by the other players), we present a model in which, generically (in a precise sense), finite‐player games have strict pure strategy Nash equilibria if the number of agents is large.
Guilherme Carmona, Konrad Podczeck
wiley   +1 more source

Equilibrium in misspecified Markov decision processes

Theoretical Economics, Volume 16, Issue 2, Page 717-757, May 2021., 2021
We provide an equilibrium framework for modeling the behavior of an agent who holds a simplified view of a dynamic optimization problem. The agent faces a Markov decision process, where a transition probability function determines the evolution of a state variable as a function of the previous state and the agent's action.
Ignacio Esponda, Demian Pouzo
wiley   +1 more source

A necessary and sufficient condition for upper hemicontinuous set-valued mappings without compact-values being upper demicontinuous [PDF]

Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society, 1998
The purpose of this article is to give a characterization of an upper hemicontinuous mapping with non-empty convex values being upper demicontinuous, i.e., we show that an upper hemicontinuous set-valued mapping with non-empty convex values (not necessarily compact-valued) is upper demicontinuous if and only if the set-valued mapping has no interior ...
Yang, Gan-Shang, Yuan, George Xian-Zhi
openaire   +2 more sources

Marginal Reputation

Econometrica, Volume 93, Issue 6, Page 2007-2042, November 2025.
We study reputation formation where a long‐run player repeatedly observes private signals and takes actions. Short‐run players observe the long‐run player's past actions but not her past signals. The long‐run player can thus develop a reputation for playing a distribution over actions, but not necessarily for playing a particular mapping from signals ...
Daniel Luo, Alexander Wolitzky
wiley   +1 more source

Super‐Nash Performance

International Economic Review, Volume 66, Issue 4, Page 1487-1503, October 2025.
ABSTRACT In this paper, I introduce a novel benchmark in games, super‐Nash performance, and a solution concept, optimin, whereby players maximize their minimal payoff under unilateral profitable deviations by other players. Optimin achieves super‐Nash performance in that, for every Nash equilibrium, there exists an optimin where each player not only ...
Mehmet S. Ismail
wiley   +1 more source

Market Allocations Under Conflation of Goods

International Economic Review, Volume 66, Issue 4, Page 1681-1691, October 2025.
ABSTRACT We study competitive equilibria in exchange economies when a continuum of goods is conflated into a finite set of commodities. The design of conflation choices affects the allocation of scarce resources among agents, by constraining trading opportunities and shifting competitive pressures.
Niccolò Urbinati, Marco LiCalzi
wiley   +1 more source