Results 31 to 40 of about 87 (66)
Adversarial coordination and public information design
Theoretical Economics, Volume 20, Issue 2, Page 763-813, May 2025.We study flexible public information design in global games. In addition to receiving public information from the designer, agents are endowed with exogenous private information and must decide between two actions (invest and not invest), the profitability of which depends on unknown fundamentals and the agents' aggregate action.
Nicolas Inostroza, Alessandro Pavan
wiley +1 more source
The Political Economy of Zero‐Sum Thinking
Econometrica, Volume 93, Issue 1, Page 41-70, January 2025.This paper offers a strategic rationale for zero‐sum thinking in elections. We show that asymmetric information and distributional considerations together make voters wary of policies supported by others. This force impels a majority of voters to support policies contrary to their preferences and information.
S. Nageeb Ali +2 more
wiley +1 more source
Dynamic economics with quantile preferences
Theoretical Economics, Volume 20, Issue 1, Page 353-425, January 2025.This paper studies a dynamic quantile model for intertemporal decisions under uncertainty, in which the decision maker maximizes the τ‐quantile of the stream of future utilities, for τ ∈ (0,1). We present two sets of contributions. First, we generalize existing results in directions that are important for applications.
Luciano de Castro +2 more
wiley +1 more source
RAZOR‐THIN MASS ELECTIONS WITH HIGH TURNOUT
International Economic Review, Volume 65, Issue 4, Page 1607-1624, November 2024.Abstract We argue that traditional voting models fail to fully explain the frequency of very close mass elections with high turnout. Instead, we model elections as a competition between incentive schemes to mobilize voters. We elucidate conditions under which parties might prefer close elections, as the potential to be pivotal motivates voters instead ...
David K. Levine, Cesar Martinelli
wiley +1 more source
Fighting terrorism: How to position rapid response teams?
Naval Research Logistics (NRL), Volume 71, Issue 5, Page 709-727, August 2024.Abstract In light of recent terrorist attacks, we introduce and study a Stackelberg game between a government and a terrorist. In this game, the government positions a number of heavily‐armed rapid response teams on a line segment (e.g., a long boulevard or shopping avenue) and then the terrorist attacks a location with the highest potential impact of ...
Lotte van Aken +3 more
wiley +1 more source
Dynamics of market making algorithms in dealer markets: Learning and tacit collusion
Mathematical Finance, Volume 34, Issue 2, Page 467-521, April 2024.Abstract The widespread use of market‐making algorithms in electronic over‐the‐counter markets may give rise to unexpected effects resulting from the autonomous learning dynamics of these algorithms. In particular the possibility of “tacit collusion” among market makers has increasingly received regulatory scrutiny.
Rama Cont, Wei Xiong
wiley +1 more source
Applied Mathematics Letters, 1998 zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
openaire +3 more sources
Optimal delegation and information transmission under limited awareness
Theoretical Economics, Volume 19, Issue 1, Page 245-284, January 2024.We study the delegation problem between a principal and an agent, who not only has better information about the performance of the available actions but also superior awareness of the set of actions that are actually feasible. We provide conditions under which the agent finds it optimal to leave the principal unaware of relevant options.
Sarah Auster, Nicola Pavoni
wiley +1 more source
Approximation of martingale couplings on the line in the adapted weak topology. [PDF]
Probab Theory Relat Fields, 2022 Beiglböck M +3 more
europepmc +1 more source
Du Bois-Reymond Type Lemma and Its Application to Dirichlet Problem with the p(t)-Laplacian on a Bounded Time Scale. [PDF]
Entropy (Basel), 2021 Mawhin J +2 more
europepmc +1 more source