Results 41 to 50 of about 990 (105)
Du Bois-Reymond Type Lemma and Its Application to Dirichlet Problem with the p(t)-Laplacian on a Bounded Time Scale. [PDF]
Entropy (Basel), 2021 Mawhin J +2 more
europepmc +1 more source
Nash bargaining and risk aversion
Games Econ. Behav., 2016 It is widely accepted among axiomatic bargaining theorists that if one bargainer is more risk averse than a second, the second will be a tougher bargaining opponent than the first against all opponents.
G. Rausser, Leo Simon
semanticscholar +1 more source
This paper covers the theory of the uncovered set used in the literatures on tournaments and spatial voting. I discern three main extant definitions, and I introduce two new concepts that bound exist- ing sets from above and below: the deep uncovered set
John Duggan
core
Econometrics for Learning Agents
, 2015 The main goal of this paper is to develop a theory of inference of player valuations from observed data in the generalized second price auction without relying on the Nash equilibrium assumption.
Nekipelov, Denis +2 more
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Regularity of Pure Strategy Equilibrium Points in a Class of Bargaining Games [PDF]
For a class of n-player (n ? 2) sequential bargaining games with probabilistic recognition and general agreement rules, we characterize pure strategy Stationary Subgame Perfect (PSSP) equilibria via a finite number of equalities and inequalities.
Tasos Kalandrakis
core
Coalitional Bargaining Equilibria [PDF]
This paper takes up the foundational issue of existence of stationary subgame perfect equi- libria in a general class of coalitional bargaining games that includes many known bargaining models and models of coalition formation.
John Duggan
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Moral hazard and private monitoring [PDF]
game theory;moral hazard ...
Bhaskar, V., Damme, E.E.C. van
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Beliefs in Network Games (Revised version of CentER DP 2007-46) [PDF]
Networks can have an important effect on economic outcomes. Given the complexity of many of these networks, agents will generally not know their structure.
Kets, W.
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Simple Two-Stage Inference for A Class of Partially Identified Models [PDF]
, 2013 This note proposes a new two-stage estimation and inference procedure for a class of partially identified models. The procedure can be considered an extension of classical minimum distance estimation procedures to accommodate inequality constraints and ...
Shi, Xiaoxia, Shum, Matthew
core
Stationary Markov Perfect Equilibria in Discounted Stochastic Games
, 2017 The existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibria in stochastic games is shown under a general condition called "(decomposable) coarser transition kernels".
He, Wei, Sun, Yeneng
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