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Incompatibilism and the garden of forking paths [PDF]

Philosophical Issues, Volume 33, Issue 1, Page 110-123, October 2023., 2023
Abstract Let (leeway) incompatibilism be the thesis that causal determinism is incompatible with the freedom to do otherwise. Several prominent authors have claimed that incompatibilism alone can capture, or at least best captures, the intuitive appeal behind Jorge Luis Borges's famous “Garden of Forking Paths” metaphor.
Andrew Law
openalex   +2 more sources

Manipulation Cases in Free Will and Moral Responsibility, Part 1: Cases and Arguments. [PDF]

Philos Compass
ABSTRACT A common style of argument in the literature on free will and moral responsibility is the Manipulation Argument. These tend to begin with a case of an agent in a deterministic universe who is manipulated, say, via brain surgery, into performing some action. Intuitively, this agent is not responsible for that action.
De Marco G, Cyr TW.
europepmc   +2 more sources

Autonomous Agency in Anti‐Dualistic Social Ontologies: A Compatibilist Notion

Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, Volume 53, Issue 4, Page 653-674, December 2023., 2023
Abstract Anti‐dualistic social ontologies, those highlighting the intrinsic interdependency of agency and structure as two sides of the same coin, are sometimes criticized for failing to provide a satisfactory account of autonomous – capable and free – agency, or even denying the reality of such agency.
Tero Piiroinen
wiley   +1 more source

It would be bad if compatibilism were true; therefore, it isn't

Philosophical Issues, Volume 33, Issue 1, Page 270-284, October 2023., 2023
Abstract I want to suggest that it would be bad if compatibilism were true, and that this gives us good reason to think that it isn't. This is, you might think, an outlandish argument, and the considerable burden of this paper is to convince you otherwise. There are two key elements at stake in this argument.
Patrick Todd
wiley   +1 more source

A new solution to the problem of luck

Philosophical Issues, Volume 33, Issue 1, Page 314-327, October 2023., 2023
Abstract The issue of whether and how we have the control necessary for freedom and moral responsibility is central to all control accounts of freedom and moral responsibility. The problem of luck for libertarians aims to show that indeterministic agents are ill‐equipped with the control required for freedom and moral responsibility.
Ann Whittle
wiley   +1 more source

Causal counterfactuals without miracles or backtracking

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 107, Issue 2, Page 439-469, September 2023., 2023
Abstract If the laws are deterministic, then standard theories of counterfactuals are forced to reject at least one of the following conditionals: 1) had you chosen differently, there would not have been a violation of the laws of nature; and 2) had you chosen differently, the initial conditions of the universe would not have been different.
J. Dmitri Gallow
wiley   +1 more source

Conditional analyses of options for action: A partial defence

Theoria, Volume 89, Issue 4, Page 548-563, August 2023., 2023
Abstract The idea of multiple options for action in a specific situation is essential for choice and deliberation. But what exactly is an option for action? A simple and natural approach to this question is via conditional analyses. While conditional analyses of dispositions and abilities face well‐known objections and are widely considered untenable ...
Jacob Rosenthal
wiley   +1 more source

Foreknowledge requires determinism

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 107, Issue 1, Page 125-146, July 2023., 2023
Abstract There is a longstanding argument that purports to show that divine foreknowledge is inconsistent with human freedom to do otherwise. Proponents of this argument, however, have for some time been met with the following reply: the argument posits what would have to be a mysterious non‐causal constraint on freedom.
Patrick Todd
wiley   +1 more source

On noticing transparent states: A compatibilist approach to transparency

European Journal of Philosophy, Volume 31, Issue 2, Page 398-412, June 2023., 2023
Abstract According to the transparency thesis, some conscious states are transparent or “diaphanous”. This thesis is often believed to be incompatible with an inner‐awareness account of phenomenal consciousness. In this article, I reject this incompatibility. Instead, I defend a compatibilist approach to transparency.
Arnaud Dewalque
wiley   +1 more source

Free will and self expression: A compatibilist garden of forking paths

, 2023
Philosophical Issues, Volume 33, Issue 1, Page 299-313, October 2023.
Robyn Repko Waller
wiley   +1 more source