Results 51 to 60 of about 153 (145)

Indirect compatibilism

open access: yesNoûs, Volume 58, Issue 1, Page 141-162, March 2024.
Abstract In this paper I will introduce a new compatibilist account of free action: indirect conscious control compatibilism, or just indirect compatibilism for short. On this account, actions are free either when they are caused by compatibilist‐friendly conscious psychological processes, or else by sub‐personal level processes influenced in ...
Andrew J. Latham
wiley   +1 more source

Response to Dennett on Free Will Skepticism

open access: yesRivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia, 2017
What is at stake in the debate between those, such as Sam Harris and me, who contend that we would lack free will on the supposition that we are causally determined agents, and those that defend the claim that we might then retain free will, such as ...
Derk Pereboom
doaj   +1 more source

Locating Rights in the Afro-Communitarian Scheme: Testing the Compatibilist Argument

open access: yesArụmarụka, 2022
In this paper, I explore the relationship between individual rights and duties within the Afro-communitarian discourse in African political philosophy. The notion of individual rights is prominent in modern African political philosophy, which is usually ...
Tosin Adeate
doaj   +1 more source

Incompatibilism and the Avoidability of Blame [PDF]

open access: yesEthics, 1998
Examinant les conditions d'attribution de la responsabilite d'une action mauvaise, ainsi que le principe des possibilites alternatives qui fonde l'argument de l'incompatibilite entre le determinisme et la faute, l'A. oppose le principe de l'evitabilite de la faute a la critique de l'incompatibilisme developpee par H. Frankfurt.
openaire   +2 more sources

Discordant belief and principle of necessity [PDF]

open access: yesحکمت و فلسفه, 2015
The transfer of necessity principle (the consequence of anecessary issue which itself is also necessary) is seen as the base of consequent argument vindicating the belief of incompatibility of free will with causal determinism.
Zeynab Abolghasemi Dehaghani   +1 more
doaj  

Molinism, Question-Begging, and Foreknowledge of Indeterminates

open access: yesPerichoresis: The Theological Journal of Emanuel University, 2018
John Martin Fischer’s charge that Molinism does not offer a unique answer to the dilemma of divine foreknowledge and human freedom can be seen as a criticism of middle knowledge for begging the question of FF (foreknowledge and freedom)-compatibilism. In
Laing John D.
doaj   +1 more source

Libet-like Experiments and the Efficacy of the Will

open access: yesRivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia, 2015
Skepticism about free will is increasingly often associated with the results of some empirical tests – launched by Libet’s trailblazing experiments on the timing of conscious intentions – aiming to teach us that our apparently free choices are originated
Sofia Bonicalzi
doaj   +1 more source

Abilities and Incompatibilism

open access: yes, 2021
Abstract This chapter begins the task of relating a contextualist account of agential modals to questions concerning freedom. In the first two sections, different ways of characterizing abilities and their relationship to freedom are discussed.
openaire   +1 more source

Obligation Incompatibilism and Blameworthiness

open access: yesPhilosophical Papers, 2021
Obligation incompatibilism is the view that determinism precludes moral obligation. I argue for the following. (i) Two principles, ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ and ‘ought not’ is equivalent to ‘impermissible’, generate a powerful argument for obligation incompatibilism.
openaire   +2 more sources

Free will, determinism, and compatibilism: Blind spots in the theoretical landscape [PDF]

open access: yesBelgrade Philosophical Annual
Philosophical discourse on 'the' problem of free will has been shaped by three basic options: Libertarianism (accept free will and incompatibility, but deny determinism), hard determinism (accept determinism and incompatibility, but deny free will), and ...
Walter Sven
doaj   +1 more source

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