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Journal of Philosophical Logic, 1998
It is well known that there are serious obstacles to obtain constructive completeness results for intuitionistic (predicate) logic IL since completeness for IL with respect to intuitionistic validity implies a form of the Markov principle. The author studies so-called natural (also called intuitive or internal) interpretations of IL which are based on ...
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It is well known that there are serious obstacles to obtain constructive completeness results for intuitionistic (predicate) logic IL since completeness for IL with respect to intuitionistic validity implies a form of the Markov principle. The author studies so-called natural (also called intuitive or internal) interpretations of IL which are based on ...
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2018
Ultimately, mathematical intuitionism gets its name and its epistemological parentage from a conviction of Kant: that intuition reveals basic mathematical principles as true a priori. Intuitionism’s mathematical lineage is that of radical constructivism: constructive in requiring proofs of existential claims to yield provable instances of those claims;
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Ultimately, mathematical intuitionism gets its name and its epistemological parentage from a conviction of Kant: that intuition reveals basic mathematical principles as true a priori. Intuitionism’s mathematical lineage is that of radical constructivism: constructive in requiring proofs of existential claims to yield provable instances of those claims;
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2006
AbstractThis chapter criticizes moral intuitionism, which claims that some moral beliefs are justified independently of any ability to infer them from other beliefs. It defines moral intuitionism, and argues that beliefs need confirmation when they are partial, controversial, emotional, or formed in circumstances that are conducive to illusion or ...
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AbstractThis chapter criticizes moral intuitionism, which claims that some moral beliefs are justified independently of any ability to infer them from other beliefs. It defines moral intuitionism, and argues that beliefs need confirmation when they are partial, controversial, emotional, or formed in circumstances that are conducive to illusion or ...
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2000
Abstract Intuitionism, the second type of descriptivism, is the theory that the truth conditions of moral statements depend on irreducible moral properties, which must be defined in moral terms. The intuitionist claims that we have knowledge of moral truths derived from moral intuition. However, because it is a subjective experience, one
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Abstract Intuitionism, the second type of descriptivism, is the theory that the truth conditions of moral statements depend on irreducible moral properties, which must be defined in moral terms. The intuitionist claims that we have knowledge of moral truths derived from moral intuition. However, because it is a subjective experience, one
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2014
After a brief survey of Godel’s personal contacts with Brouwer and Heyting, examples are discussed where intuitionistic ideas had a direct influence on Godel’s technical work. Then it is argued that the closest rapprochement of Godel to intuitionism is seen in the development of the Dialectica Interpretation, during which he came to accept the notion ...
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After a brief survey of Godel’s personal contacts with Brouwer and Heyting, examples are discussed where intuitionistic ideas had a direct influence on Godel’s technical work. Then it is argued that the closest rapprochement of Godel to intuitionism is seen in the development of the Dialectica Interpretation, during which he came to accept the notion ...
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2015
Abstract This chapter concerns Sidgwick’s moral epistemology. His notion of intuitions as self-evident beliefs is explained, and his three ‘phases’ of intuitionism (perceptional, dogmatic, and philosophical) are outlined. Some doubt is expressed over Sidgwick’s quick dismissal of perceptional intuitionism, and his arguments against ...
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Abstract This chapter concerns Sidgwick’s moral epistemology. His notion of intuitions as self-evident beliefs is explained, and his three ‘phases’ of intuitionism (perceptional, dogmatic, and philosophical) are outlined. Some doubt is expressed over Sidgwick’s quick dismissal of perceptional intuitionism, and his arguments against ...
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2007
Robert Audi's new book1 is the most up-to-date, sophisticated and comprehensive development of ethical intuitionism yet to appear. It ranges over a great amount of philosophical territory, and does so in a clear, and historically informed manner. Its timing nicely coincides with a renewed interest in intuitionism, and the book will serve as a required ...
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Robert Audi's new book1 is the most up-to-date, sophisticated and comprehensive development of ethical intuitionism yet to appear. It ranges over a great amount of philosophical territory, and does so in a clear, and historically informed manner. Its timing nicely coincides with a renewed interest in intuitionism, and the book will serve as a required ...
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Social Philosophy and Policy, 2007
I discuss four kinds of challenges to the reliability of ethical intuitions. Ethical intuitions have been impugned for being incoherent with each other, for being unduly influenced by culture, for being unduly influenced by biological instincts, and for being unduly influenced by personal interests and emotions.
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I discuss four kinds of challenges to the reliability of ethical intuitions. Ethical intuitions have been impugned for being incoherent with each other, for being unduly influenced by culture, for being unduly influenced by biological instincts, and for being unduly influenced by personal interests and emotions.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2013
In the recent metaethical literature there has been significant interest in the prospects for what I am denoting ‘Perceptual Intuitionism’: the view that normal ethical agents can and do have non‐inferential justification for first‐order ethical beliefs by having ethical perceptual experiences, e.g., Cullison 2010, McBrayer 2010, Vayrynen 2008. If true,
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In the recent metaethical literature there has been significant interest in the prospects for what I am denoting ‘Perceptual Intuitionism’: the view that normal ethical agents can and do have non‐inferential justification for first‐order ethical beliefs by having ethical perceptual experiences, e.g., Cullison 2010, McBrayer 2010, Vayrynen 2008. If true,
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