Results 21 to 30 of about 402 (174)

Towards a mental probability logic

open access: yesPsychologica Belgica, 2005
We propose probability logic as an appropriate standard of reference for evaluating human inferences. Probability logical accounts of nonmonotonic reasoning with SYSTEM P, and conditional syllogisms (MODUS PONENS, etc.) are explored.
Niki Pfeifer, Gernot D. Kleiter
doaj   +1 more source

Revisiting McGee’s Counterexample to Modus Ponens

open access: yesEuropean Journal of Analytic Philosophy
In this paper, we provide a novel explanation of McGee’s (1985) alleged counterexample to Modus Ponens for indicative conditionals. Our strategy is to show that pragmatic phenomena interfere with intuitions concerning the acceptability of the inference ...
Nicolás Lo Guercio, Mariela Rubin
doaj   +1 more source

Maintaining the Divide: The Legitimate Role for the Public in Health and Science Policymaking

open access: yesBioethics, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Many of the most pressing policy choices we face are matters of health and science. How should we prepare for the next global pandemic? How should we manage the disruption and promise of artificial intelligence? How should we address the challenge of climate change?
Joshua J. Kassner
wiley   +1 more source

Generic Modal Cut Elimination Applied to Conditional Logics [PDF]

open access: yesLogical Methods in Computer Science, 2011
We develop a general criterion for cut elimination in sequent calculi for propositional modal logics, which rests on absorption of cut, contraction, weakening and inversion by the purely modal part of the rule system. Our criterion applies also to a wide
Dirk Pattinson, Lutz Schröder
doaj   +1 more source

Visual Cues for Logical Reasoning about Text Enhance Metacognitive Sensitivity

open access: yesComputer Graphics Forum, EarlyView.
Abstract An important part of critical thinking is analyzing the logical structure of inferences made in text, such as checking whether if–then rules appearing in legal regulations or scientific arguments are applied correctly. Metacognitive sensitivity, defined as feeling confident about one's correct answers and uncertain about incorrect ones, is an ...
A. Schlieder, J. Rummel, F. Sadlo
wiley   +1 more source

Logical and gnoseological features of diagnosis

open access: yesБюллетень сибирской медицины, 2003
A diagnosis, as a type of getting knowledge (alongside with science and education) goes from consequences to a reason (from symptoms to nosological unit), this determines it’s hypothetical character.
A. K. Sukhotin
doaj   +1 more source

How generics obscure the logic of conditionals

open access: yesMind &Language, EarlyView.
This paper discusses counter‐examples to modus ponens and modus tollens involving modals and quantificational adverbs, and presents new counter‐examples with generic conditionals. We argue that the counter‐examples are spurious, and are explained by the domain‐restricting effects of if‐clauses.
Daniel Lassiter   +3 more
wiley   +1 more source

Fully implicational methods for interval-valued fuzzy reasoning with multi-antecedent rules [PDF]

open access: yesInternational Journal of Computational Intelligence Systems, 2011
Based on the fully implicational idea, we investigate the interval-valued fuzzy reasoning with multiantecedent rules. First, we construct a class of interval-valued fuzzy implications by means of a type of implications and a parameter on the unit ...
Hua-Wen Liu, Cheng Li
doaj   +1 more source

On the Adoption Problem and Meta-Logical Monism

open access: yesAnálisis Filosófico, 2022
According to the Adoption Problem (AP) certain basic logical principles cannot be adopted. Drawing on the AP, Suki Finn presents an argument against logical pluralism: Modus Ponens (MP) and Universal Instantiation (UI) both govern a general structure ...
Mauro Santelli   +2 more
doaj   +1 more source

Being Biased and Knowing How to Reason

open access: yesNoûs, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT This essay explains how reasoning is action and not reflex. It then uses that theory to explain one form of knowing how to reason. Reasoning is thinking biased by knowledge. Drawing on Louise Antony's emphasis on bias as critical for dealing with underdetermination in induction, I show that underdetermination confronts all forms of reasoning ...
Wayne Wu
wiley   +1 more source

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