Results 1 to 10 of about 169 (166)

Inefficiency of Nash Equilibria [PDF]

open access: yesMathematics of Operations Research, 1986
It is shown that Nash Equilibria of smooth games generally tend to be inefficient in the Pareto sense.
Pradeep Dubey
exaly   +4 more sources

Cell Autophagy in NASH and NASH-Related Hepatocellular Carcinoma

open access: yesInternational Journal of Molecular Sciences, 2022
Autophagy, a cellular self-digestion process, involves the degradation of targeted cell components such as damaged organelles, unfolded proteins, and intracellular pathogens by lysosomes. It is a major quality control system of the cell and plays an important role in cell differentiation, survival, development, and homeostasis.
Juan Sanabria, Utibe-Abasi Sunday Udoh
exaly   +3 more sources

Secret contracting and Nash-in-Nash bargaining

open access: yesSN Business & Economics, 2021
In take-it-or-leave-it vertical contracting, an equilibrium with passive beliefs may fail to exist. We argue that this problem can be alleviated by tackling the contracting stage of the game through a cooperative approach. The outcome of the take-it-or-leave-it game then coincides with the limit of the cooperative solution when the bargaining power of ...
Bacchiega, Emanuele, Bonroy, Olivier
openaire   +3 more sources

Nash blocks [PDF]

open access: yesInternational Journal of Game Theory, 2021
AbstractA product set of pure strategies is a Nash block if it contains all best replies to the Nash equilibria of the game in which the players are restricted to the strategies in the block. This defines an intermediate block property, between curb (Basu and Weibull, Econ Lett 36(2):141–146, 10.1016/0165-1765(91)90179-O, http://www.sciencedirect.com ...
openaire   +2 more sources

The Nash Bargaining Solution is Nash Implementable [PDF]

open access: yesSSRN Electronic Journal, 1998
Some authors present models in which they show that the Nash bargaining solution fails to be Maskin monotonic and hence cannot be implemented in Nash equilibrium. We find this results misleading and discuss how implementability of the Nash bargaining solution can be discussed in utility space.
openaire   +2 more sources

Beyond Nash Bargaining Theory: The Nash Set [PDF]

open access: yesJournal of Economic Theory, 1998
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Serrano, Roberto, Shimomura, Ken-Ichi
openaire   +3 more sources

'Nash-in-Nash' Bargaining: A Microfoundation for Applied Work [PDF]

open access: yesSSRN Electronic Journal, 2016
A \Nash equilibrium in Nash bargains" has become the workhorse bargaining model in applied analyses of bilateral oligopoly. This paper proposes a non-cooperative foundation for \Nash-in-Nash" bargaining that extends the Rubinstein (1982) model to multiple upstream and downstream rms.
Allan Collard-Wexler   +2 more
openaire   +2 more sources

The Nash equilibrium: A perspective [PDF]

open access: yesProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 2004
In 1950, John Nash contributed a remarkable one-page PNAS article that defined and characterized a notion of equilibrium for n- person games. This notion, now called the “Nash equilibrium,” has been widely applied and adapted in economics and other behavioral sciences.
Holt, Charles A., Roth, Alvin E.
openaire   +2 more sources

Molecular Pathogenesis of NASH [PDF]

open access: yesInternational Journal of Molecular Sciences, 2016
Nonalcoholic steatohepatitis (NASH) is the main cause of chronic liver disease in the Western world and a major health problem, owing to its close association with obesity, diabetes, and the metabolic syndrome. NASH progression results from numerous events originating within the liver, as well as from signals derived from the adipose tissue and the ...
CALIGIURI, ALESSANDRA   +2 more
openaire   +2 more sources

Universality of Nash components [PDF]

open access: yesGames and Economic Behavior, 2014
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Dieter Balkenborg, Dries Vermeulen
openaire   +5 more sources

Home - About - Disclaimer - Privacy