Results 71 to 80 of about 917 (201)
The Nash bargaining solution is optimal [PDF]
The author studies the classical two-person bargaining game. The set F consists of all bargaining solutions that satisfy the following known axioms: Pareto optimality, scale invariance, symmetry and risk sensitivity. It is proved that for any bargaining game S the set \(\{\) f(S): \(f\in S\}\) is closed and connected. A meta bargaining game \(\Gamma\) (
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Serial Investing and Strategic Commitment in Markets With Unknown Competitors
ABSTRACT We study how serial investors who regularly face unknown competitors attempt to make their projects dominant. Innovating in new markets often involves uncertainty over the nature of the final product and who the key competitors will be. Such projects also have long‐term funding needs, so a commitment to provide the necessary funds imparts a ...
Naveen Khanna, Richmond Mathews
wiley +1 more source
One‐Way Versus Two‐Way Postacquisition Integration Efforts: Theory and Evidence
ABSTRACT We develop a theory of postacquisition integration that distinguishes between one‐way (acquirer‐only) and two‐way (mutual) effort strategies. We argue that the method of payment—cash versus shares—may serve as an ex ante commitment mechanism to a particular integration strategy, where cash deals align with unilateral effort, and share deals ...
Albert Banal‐Estañol +3 more
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To improve the regulatory capacity of distributed resources within the park and enhance the flexibility of market transactions, this paper introduces a distributed dispatch and profit allocation method grounded in cooperative game theory and the ...
Hanwen Wang +3 more
doaj +1 more source
Liquidity Crises and the Market‐Maker of Last Resort
Abstract We study market illiquidity in an economy subject to nonfundamental shocks. Asset trading occurs via decentralized bargaining. The model has multiple rational expectations equilibria; we associate certain Pareto‐inferior equilibria with liquidity crises.
CHARLES M. KAHN +2 more
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Nash Bargaining without Convexity
In this note I study Nash bargaining when the utility possibility set of the bargaining problem is non-convex. A simple variation of Nash's symmetry axiom is all that is necessary to establish a set valued version of Nash's solution in non-convex settings.
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Policy Biases in a Model with Labor‐Market Frictions
Abstract We develop a model with labor‐market matching frictions that is subject to a range of shocks, including shocks to matching efficiency and bargaining power, and use the model to examine how monetary policy should respond to such shocks. We show that optimal monetary policy responds effectively to these shocks, producing economic outcomes that ...
RICHARD DENNIS, TATIANA KIRSANOVA
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Resolving water security conflicts in agriculture by a cooperative Nash bargaining approach
Water scarcity is increasingly driven by socio-economic dynamics, climate change, and population growth. Conflicts among water users, including states, complicate sustainable water management, necessitating collaborative solutions.
Shahmir Janjua +3 more
doaj +1 more source
Nash Bargaining Approach for Fair and Efficient LTE–WiFi Aggregation
As the demand for mobile traffic is growing, radio frequency bandwidths often become insufficient for guaranteeing specific performance. Utilizing unlicensed 5 GHz broadband bandwidths, the LWA system enables the synergistic use of LTE and WiFi systems ...
Dohoon Kim, Keunhee Lee, Jae-Hoon Kim
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Innovation, Licensing, and Competition: Evidence From Genetically Engineered Crops
ABSTRACT We provide a novel empirical analysis of the role of technology licensing, between competitors, for genetically engineered (GE) traits in the US seed industry. We extend the standard differentiated‐product Bertrand pricing model to include trait licensing, which permits us to recover marginal costs and (otherwise unobserved) royalty rates ...
GianCarlo Moschini, Edward D. Perry
wiley +1 more source

