Results 91 to 100 of about 1,721 (242)
Integrative Zoology, EarlyView.Sexual cannibalism (SC), where one mating partner consumes the other in the context of mating, is especially prevalent among spiders. However, the evolution of SC in spiders is still not fully understood. We review key hypotheses for SC and explore how female‐initiated SC has driven the evolution of various male counter‐adaptations to mitigate its ...
Simona Kralj‐Fišer +3 more
wiley +1 more source
Stackelberg Contention Games in Multiuser Networks
EURASIP Journal on Advances in Signal Processing, 2009 Interactions among selfish users sharing a common transmission channel can be modeled as a noncooperative game using the game theory framework. When selfish users choose their transmission probabilities independently without any coordination mechanism ...
Jaeok Park, Mihaela van der Schaar
doaj +1 more source
The RAND Journal of Economics, EarlyView.ABSTRACT We study a long‐horizon, oligopolistic market with random shocks to demand that can be arbitraged by two storage operators with finite capacity. This problem applies to any storable commodity—that is, most commodities. Because the arbitrage spread is so sensitive to market power, storage operators face strong incentives to restrain quantities ...
Sergei Balakin, Guillaume Roger
wiley +1 more source
Game dynamics and Nash equilibria
Journal of Dynamics & Games, 2014 If a game has a unique Nash equilibrium, then this equilibrium is arguably the solution of the game from the refinement's literature point of view. However, it might be that for almost all initial conditions, all strategies in the support of this equilibrium are eliminated by the replicator dynamics and the best-reply dynamics.
openaire +5 more sources
Why Is Exclusivity in Broadcasting Rights Prevalent and Why Does Simple Regulation Fail?
The RAND Journal of Economics, EarlyView.ABSTRACT Pay‐TV firms compete both downstream to attract viewers and upstream to acquire broadcasting rights. Because profits inherited from downstream competition satisfy a convexity property, allocating rights to the dominant firm maximizes the industry profit.
David Martimort, Jerome Pouyet
wiley +1 more source
PRINCIPII DE ECHILIBRU PARETO-NASH-STACKELBERG
Studia Universitatis Moldaviae: Stiinte Umanistice, 2010 We consider the problem of determining the set of Pareto-Nash-Stackelberg equilibria in strategic games. The main results are formulated and explained. A procedure for the equilibrium set determining is presented.
USM ADMIN
doaj
Network Structure and the Efficiency Gains from Mergers: Evidence from U.S. Freight Railroads
The RAND Journal of Economics, EarlyView.ABSTRACT The trade‐off between market power and efficiency gains is central to antitrust analyses of mergers, but empirical evidence quantifying efficiencies remains limited. Using transaction‐level data from U.S. freight railroads (1985–2005), this article quantifies merger‐induced cost efficiencies, driven mainly by eliminating inter‐railroad ...
Yanyou Chen
wiley +1 more source
Spatial price competition and buyer power in the U.S. beef packing industry
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, EarlyView.Abstract We develop a spatially‐explicit model of the U.S. beef packing industry to study key questions related to competition in an oligopsony setting. Cattle supplies are modeled at the county level, and packing plants' location, capacity, and ownership are taken as given. Packers procure negotiated cattle by competing in prices in each local (county)
GianCarlo Moschini, T. Jake Smith
wiley +1 more source
Examining Marital Infidelity via Game Theory
MathematicsObjective: Marital infidelity significantly impacts both the community and the institution of marriage. This study aims to develop a theoretical framework for analyzing marital infidelity through a game-theoretic lens.
Limor Dina Gonen +2 more
doaj +1 more source
Competitive diplomacy in bargaining and war
American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView.Abstract War is often viewed as a bargaining problem. However, prior to bargaining, countries can vie for leverage by expending effort on diplomacy. This article presents a dynamic model of conflict where agenda‐setting power is endogenous to pre‐bargaining diplomatic competition.
Joseph J. Ruggiero
wiley +1 more source