Results 121 to 130 of about 1,721 (242)

Profitability of private brands of e‐commerce platforms offering competing national brands under agency selling

International Transactions in Operational Research, EarlyView.
Abstract This paper investigates the impact of a private brand (PB) introduction by an e‐commerce platform. Contrary to previous research, the platform allows competing manufacturers to sell their national brands (NBs) directly to consumers for an agency fee. Our game‐theoretic analysis allows us to derive the following key insights.
Salma Karray, Simon P. Sigué
wiley   +1 more source

Data Portability and Interoperability Between Digital Platforms

Journal of Economics &Management Strategy, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT We examine the effects of regulation requiring data portability and interoperability in digital platform competition. Data portability and interoperability have the effect of eliminating switching costs between platforms and enlarging network externalities but increasing the risk of data breaches.
Jeong‐Yoo Kim
wiley   +1 more source

Navigable networks as Nash equilibria of navigation games. [PDF]

Nat Commun, 2015
Gulyás A, Bíró JJ, Kőrösi A, Rétvári G, Krioukov D.   +4 more
europepmc   +1 more source

Bank Capital and Misconduct Incentives

Journal of Economics &Management Strategy, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT This paper studies large banks' incentives to engage in misconduct by abusing their dominant position in the market for loans and by mis‐selling an add‐on financial product to depositors. We draw new connections between stability‐focused prudential regulation and misconduct by studying the impact of higher capital requirements on misconduct ...
Jacob Seifert
wiley   +1 more source

Cross Ownership Versus Merger Under Product Differentiation

Journal of Economics &Management Strategy, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT We compare the merger participants' profits under a merger and under cross ownership (CO) in an oligopolistic industry with horizontally differentiated products. We show under Cournot competition that the merger participants would be better off under a symmetric CO than a merger.
Arijit Mukherjee
wiley   +1 more source

Protecting Intermediate Innovations When Ideas Are Scarce: Patents or Secrecy?

Journal of Economics &Management Strategy, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Patenting an intermediate research innovation can lead to competition for the development of a final commercial innovation and potentially induce wasteful duplicative R&D efforts. This study examines the effects of different protection strategies and patent life on the incentives to protect an intermediate innovation by considering a two‐stage
Bonwoo Koo, Jangho Yang, Brian D. Wright
wiley   +1 more source

Buyer Power and the Effect of Vertical Integration on Innovation

Journal of Economics &Management Strategy, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Our article investigates the impact of vertical integration (without foreclosure) on innovation. We compare cases where either (i) two manufacturers or (ii) a manufacturer and a vertically integrated retailer invest. Then, the independent manufacturer(s) and the retailer bargain over nonlinear contracts before selling to consumers.
Claire Chambolle, Morgane Guignard
wiley   +1 more source

Computational Performance of Deep Reinforcement Learning to Find Nash Equilibria. [PDF]

Comput Econ
Graf C, Zobernig V, Schmidt J, Klöckl C.   +3 more
europepmc   +1 more source

Serial Investing and Strategic Commitment in Markets With Unknown Competitors

Journal of Economics &Management Strategy, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT We study how serial investors who regularly face unknown competitors attempt to make their projects dominant. Innovating in new markets often involves uncertainty over the nature of the final product and who the key competitors will be. Such projects also have long‐term funding needs, so a commitment to provide the necessary funds imparts a ...
Naveen Khanna, Richmond Mathews
wiley   +1 more source

One‐Way Versus Two‐Way Postacquisition Integration Efforts: Theory and Evidence

Journal of Economics &Management Strategy, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT We develop a theory of postacquisition integration that distinguishes between one‐way (acquirer‐only) and two‐way (mutual) effort strategies. We argue that the method of payment—cash versus shares—may serve as an ex ante commitment mechanism to a particular integration strategy, where cash deals align with unilateral effort, and share deals ...
Albert Banal‐Estañol, Joseph A. Clougherty, Jo Seldeslachts, Florian Szücs   +3 more
wiley   +1 more source