Results 141 to 150 of about 1,721 (242)

Policy Biases in a Model with Labor‐Market Frictions

Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, EarlyView.
Abstract We develop a model with labor‐market matching frictions that is subject to a range of shocks, including shocks to matching efficiency and bargaining power, and use the model to examine how monetary policy should respond to such shocks. We show that optimal monetary policy responds effectively to these shocks, producing economic outcomes that ...
RICHARD DENNIS, TATIANA KIRSANOVA
wiley   +1 more source

The theory of epidemics with altruism. [PDF]

Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A
Lynch MP, Schnyder SK, Molina JJ, Yamamoto R, Turner MS.   +4 more
europepmc   +1 more source

Innovation, Licensing, and Competition: Evidence From Genetically Engineered Crops

The Journal of Industrial Economics, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT We provide a novel empirical analysis of the role of technology licensing, between competitors, for genetically engineered (GE) traits in the US seed industry. We extend the standard differentiated‐product Bertrand pricing model to include trait licensing, which permits us to recover marginal costs and (otherwise unobserved) royalty rates ...
GianCarlo Moschini, Edward D. Perry
wiley   +1 more source

Quantum Negotiation Games: Toward Ethical Equilibria. [PDF]

Entropy (Basel)
Smoliński R, Frąckiewicz P, Grzanka K, Szopa M.   +3 more
europepmc   +1 more source

The Determinants of Negotiated Pharmaceutical Prices

The Journal of Industrial Economics, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT We focus on the determinants of pharmaceutical drug prices. Using data from the Brazilian pharmaceutical market, we find large variations in drug prices across buyers, drug classes, and time periods. Our estimation results provide evidence that transaction‐specific determinants between buyers and sellers (e.g., transaction volume, buyer's ...
Ralph B. Siebert, Sebastian Linde, Brandon Norton   +2 more
wiley   +1 more source

The Optimal Bribe: Price Versus Quantity Competition in Oligopolies

The Manchester School, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT We analyze an entry deterrence model between an incumbent firm and a potential entrant, where the incumbent strategically offers bribes to local officials to raise entry barriers. Our focus is a three‐stage Bertrand game under incomplete information in a differentiated goods market.
Vishavdeep Sharma, Krishnendu Ghosh Dastidar   +1 more
wiley   +1 more source

Nash equilibrium of attack and defense behaviors between predators and prey. [PDF]

PLoS Comput Biol
Ichijo H, Kawamura Y, Nakamura T.
europepmc   +1 more source

Quantitative Effects of Employment Protection in OECD Labor Markets

The Manchester School, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT This paper explores the quantitative role played by Employment Protection Legislation over employment and on‐the‐job training in the presence of dual labor markets across OECD economies. We extend the search and matching model by introducing formal education and investment decisions in training by firms, and a gap in firing costs between fixed‐
Joaquín Naval, José I. Silva
wiley   +1 more source

Cross‐Ownership and Endogenous R&D Risk in Cournot Triopoly

The Manchester School, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT We examine how cross‐ownership influences firms' endogenous R&D risk‐taking in a Cournot triopoly, where two “insider” firms hold passive equity stakes in each other, and a third firm remains unaffiliated. Firms invest in stochastic R&D that lowers marginal costs and choose their risk level—measured by outcome variance—prior to quantity ...
Mingqing Xing, Ally Quan Zhang
wiley   +1 more source

A stochastic framework to assess the optimal allocation of limited vaccine doses in foot-and-mouth disease outbreaks using game theory. [PDF]

Front Vet Sci
Moreno-Torres KI, Sanderson MW, Rigney C, Schoenbaum M, Delgado A, Arzt J, Heier Stamm JL.   +6 more
europepmc   +1 more source