Results 191 to 200 of about 1,721 (242)
Nash–Walras equilibria [PDF]
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GHOSAL, Sayantan +1 more
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Nash equilibria equal competitive equilibria [PDF]
Abstract With strictly monotone preferences and a continuum of traders, there is a game in which the set of Nash equilibria is exactly the same as the set of competitive equilibria.
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The author considers a generalization of Nash equilibrium concept, where the players information about oponents behaviour becomes the crucial aspect for the notion of equilibrium, called Conjectural Equilibrium (CE) and Rationalizable Conjectural Equilibrium (RCE). It is a continuation of the article by \textit{A. Rubinstein} and \textit{A.
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Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 1994
The multiplicity of Nash equilibria in strategic form games restricts the predictive power of the Nash equilibrium concept. In the literature many attempts are made to reduce the set of (Nash) equilibria by keeping the more desirable equilibria (refinements) or to make a convincing unique choice out of the set of Nash equilibria (equilibrium selection).
Peters, H., Vrieze, K.
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The multiplicity of Nash equilibria in strategic form games restricts the predictive power of the Nash equilibrium concept. In the literature many attempts are made to reduce the set of (Nash) equilibria by keeping the more desirable equilibria (refinements) or to make a convincing unique choice out of the set of Nash equilibria (equilibrium selection).
Peters, H., Vrieze, K.
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NASH EQUILIBRIA FROM THE CORRELATED EQUILIBRIA VIEWPOINT
International Game Theory Review, 1999We consider Nash equilibria as correlated equilibria and apply polyhedral theory to study extreme Nash equilibrium properties. We obtain an alternate proof that extreme Nash equilibria are extreme correlated equilibria and give some characteristics of them. Furthermore, we study a class of games that have no completely mixed Nash equilibria.
Gomez Canovas, Sabrina +2 more
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More strategies, more Nash equilibria [PDF]
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Bade, Sophie +2 more
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Viable Nash Equilibria: An Experiment
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2022This paper examines the usefulness of Kalai (2020)'s measure of the viability of Nash equilibrium. We experimentally study a class of participation games, which differ in the number of players, the success threshold, and the payoff to not participating.
Duk Gyoo Kim, Daehong Min, John Wooders
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Implementation Via Nash Equilibria
Econometrica, 1992The author provides a necessary and sufficient condition for a social choice correspondance to be Nash Implementable. With three or more participants this condition is what he calls essential monotonicity.
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Oblivious AQM and Nash equilibria
IEEE INFOCOM 2003. Twenty-second Annual Joint Conference of the IEEE Computer and Communications Societies (IEEE Cat. No.03CH37428), 2002An oblivious active queue management scheme is one which does not differentiate between packets belonging to different flows. In this paper, we study the existence and the quality of Nash equilibria imposed by oblivious AQM schemes on selfish agents. Oblivious AQM schemes are of obvious importance because of the ease of implementation and deployment ...
Debojyoti Dutta +2 more
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