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Convergence of Nash equilibria
1986The authors introduce a suitable notion of convergence for games, called \({\mathcal N}\)-convergence. This convergence ensures that if each game \(J_ h\) has a Nash solution \(u_ h\), \(J_ h\to^{{\mathcal N}}J_ 0\) and \(u_ h\to u_ 0\), then \(u_ 0\) is a Nash solution for \(J_ 0\); moreover the value of \(J_ 0\) in \(u_ 0=\lim_{h}u_ h\) is the limit ...
E. CAVAZZUTI, PACCHIAROTTI, Nicoletta
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2002
Abstract Subgame Perfection Very broadly, “backwards induction” refers to the idea that any solution to a given “large” problem should induce solutions to all its “small” subproblems. So, any “large” problem can be solved by first solving its “small” subproblems, then replacing the subproblems by their solutions, and finally solving ...
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Abstract Subgame Perfection Very broadly, “backwards induction” refers to the idea that any solution to a given “large” problem should induce solutions to all its “small” subproblems. So, any “large” problem can be solved by first solving its “small” subproblems, then replacing the subproblems by their solutions, and finally solving ...
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Paths to constrained Nash equilibria
Applied Mathematics & Optimization, 1993zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
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Nash Equilibria in Pure Strategies
Bulletin of Economic Research, 2003We consider an n‐person non‐zero‐sum non‐cooperative game in normal form, where the strategy sets are some closed intervals of the real line. It is shown that if the pay‐off functions are continuous on the whole space and if for each pay‐off function the smallest local maximum in the strategy variable is a global maximum, then the game possesses a pure
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Double Implementation in Nash and Undominated Nash Equilibria
Journal of Economic Theory, 1993The author introduces the concept of double implementation (Nash and Undominated Nash). He proves that with at least three agents Maskin's monotonicity is necessary and sufficient for double implementation in a large class of economic environments.
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Graphical Nash Equilibria and Replicator Dynamics on Complex Networks
IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks and Learning Systems, 2020Shaolin Tan, Yaonan Wang
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From Nash to Cournot–Nash equilibria via the Monge–Kantorovich problem
Philosophical Transactions Series A, Mathematical, Physical, and Engineering Sciences, 2014Adrien Blanchet
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On the Existence of Pure Nash Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games
Mathematics of Operations Research, 2012Tobias Harks, Max Klimm
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Computing Nash Equilibria and Evolutionarily Stable States of Evolutionary Games
IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computation, 2016Jiawei Li, Graham Kendall, Robert I John
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