Results 251 to 260 of about 234,236 (303)
Public-private partnerships for UAV-assisted emergency medical services in aging communities: an evolutionary game approach. [PDF]
Zhong J, Gao Y.
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Reverse game: from Nash equilibrium to network structure, number and probability of occurrence. [PDF]
Ebrahimi A, Sadeghi M.
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Social identity and cooperation co-evolve in a multilevel public goods game. [PDF]
Pilgrim C, Stewart AJ, Raihani NJ.
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Spatiotemporal bidding for multi-energy systems with photovoltaic dominance: a scenario-based Stackelberg-Nash game formulation. [PDF]
Qiao H, Wen S, Zhang Y, Zhang J, Li K.
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An Entropy-Based Framework for Hybrid Coalitions in Game Theory-Part I: Human Arbitration. [PDF]
Sepúlveda-Fontaine SA, Amigó JM.
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GHOSAL, Sayantan +1 more
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The author considers a generalization of Nash equilibrium concept, where the players information about oponents behaviour becomes the crucial aspect for the notion of equilibrium, called Conjectural Equilibrium (CE) and Rationalizable Conjectural Equilibrium (RCE). It is a continuation of the article by \textit{A. Rubinstein} and \textit{A.
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Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 1994
The multiplicity of Nash equilibria in strategic form games restricts the predictive power of the Nash equilibrium concept. In the literature many attempts are made to reduce the set of (Nash) equilibria by keeping the more desirable equilibria (refinements) or to make a convincing unique choice out of the set of Nash equilibria (equilibrium selection).
Peters, H., Vrieze, K.
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The multiplicity of Nash equilibria in strategic form games restricts the predictive power of the Nash equilibrium concept. In the literature many attempts are made to reduce the set of (Nash) equilibria by keeping the more desirable equilibria (refinements) or to make a convincing unique choice out of the set of Nash equilibria (equilibrium selection).
Peters, H., Vrieze, K.
openaire +1 more source

