Results 271 to 280 of about 234,236 (303)

Double implementation in Nash and -Nash equilibria

Economics Letters, 2012
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Efficient Nash equilibria on semilattices

Journal of Global Optimization, 2012
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Walter Briec, Charles Horvath, Qi Bin Liang   +2 more
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On Nash Equilibria in Stochastic Games

2003
We study infinite stochastic games played by n-players on a finite graph with goals given by sets of infinite traces. The games are stochastic (each player simultaneously and independently chooses an action at each round, and the next state is determined by a probability distribution depending on the current state and the chosen actions), infinite (the
Krishnendu Chatterjee, Rupak Majumdar, Marcin Jurdzinski   +2 more
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On the Performances of Nash Equilibria in Isolation Games

Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, 2009
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Vittorio Bilò, Michele Flammini, Gianpiero Monaco, Luca Moscardelli   +3 more
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Double Implementation in Nash and Undominated Nash Equilibria

Journal of Economic Theory, 1993
The author introduces the concept of double implementation (Nash and Undominated Nash). He proves that with at least three agents Maskin's monotonicity is necessary and sufficient for double implementation in a large class of economic environments.
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Convergence of Nash equilibria

1986
The authors introduce a suitable notion of convergence for games, called \({\mathcal N}\)-convergence. This convergence ensures that if each game \(J_ h\) has a Nash solution \(u_ h\), \(J_ h\to^{{\mathcal N}}J_ 0\) and \(u_ h\to u_ 0\), then \(u_ 0\) is a Nash solution for \(J_ 0\); moreover the value of \(J_ 0\) in \(u_ 0=\lim_{h}u_ h\) is the limit ...
E. CAVAZZUTI, PACCHIAROTTI, Nicoletta
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Reaction Functions as Nash Equilibria

The Review of Economic Studies, 1976
A "reaction function" for the ith firm, xit = i(xt.1), is a decision rule which selects a price for the firm in period t as a function of the observed price vector of period t -1. A Nash [11] non-cooperative equilibrium for this model, in which the equilibrium strategies were reaction functions, would be characterized by n reaction functions (xt), ...,
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On the topology of the set of Nash equilibria

Games and Economic Behavior, 2019
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Dieter Balkenborg, Dries Vermeulen
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Convergence Time to Nash Equilibria

2003
We study the number of steps required to reach a pure Nash Equilibrium in a load balancing scenario where each job behaves selfishly and attempts to migrate to a machine which will minimize its cost. We consider a variety of load balancing models, including identical, restricted, related and unrelated machines.
Eyal Even-Dar, Alexander Kesselman, Yishay Mansour   +2 more
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Paths to constrained Nash equilibria

Applied Mathematics & Optimization, 1993
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