Results 261 to 270 of about 234,236 (303)

Oblivious AQM and Nash equilibria

IEEE INFOCOM 2003. Twenty-second Annual Joint Conference of the IEEE Computer and Communications Societies (IEEE Cat. No.03CH37428), 2002
An oblivious active queue management scheme is one which does not differentiate between packets belonging to different flows. In this paper, we study the existence and the quality of Nash equilibria imposed by oblivious AQM schemes on selfish agents. Oblivious AQM schemes are of obvious importance because of the ease of implementation and deployment ...
Debojyoti Dutta, Ashish Goel, John S. Heidemann   +2 more
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Nash equilibria equal competitive equilibria [PDF]

Economics Letters, 1987
Abstract With strictly monotone preferences and a continuum of traders, there is a game in which the set of Nash equilibria is exactly the same as the set of competitive equilibria.
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Conditional interchangeability of Nash equilibria [PDF]

Journal of Logic and Computation, 2014
The notion of interchangeability was introduced by Nash in one of his original papers on equilibria in strategic games. It has been recently shown that propositional theory of this relation is the same as propositional theories of the non-deducibility relation in the information flow theory, the independence relation in probability theory, and the non ...
Pavel Naumov, Margaret Protzman
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NASH EQUILIBRIA FROM THE CORRELATED EQUILIBRIA VIEWPOINT

International Game Theory Review, 1999
We consider Nash equilibria as correlated equilibria and apply polyhedral theory to study extreme Nash equilibrium properties. We obtain an alternate proof that extreme Nash equilibria are extreme correlated equilibria and give some characteristics of them. Furthermore, we study a class of games that have no completely mixed Nash equilibria.
Sabrina Gomez Canovas, Pierre Hansen, Brigitte Jaumard   +2 more
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Viable Nash Equilibria: An Experiment

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2022
This paper examines the usefulness of Kalai (2020)'s measure of the viability of Nash equilibrium. We experimentally study a class of participation games, which differ in the number of players, the success threshold, and the payoff to not participating.
Duk Gyoo Kim, Daehong Min, John Wooders
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Inapproximability of pure nash equilibria

Proceedings of the fortieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing, 2008
The complexity of computing pure Nash equilibria in congestion games was recently shown to be PLS-complete. In this paper, we therefore study the complexity of computing approximate equilibria in congestion games. An alpha-approximate equilibrium, for α > 1, is a state of the game in which none of the players can make an α-greedy step, i.e., an ...
Alexander Skopalik, Berthold Vöcking
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Treewidth and Pure Nash Equilibria

2013
We consider the complexity of w-PNE-GG, the problem of computing pure Nash equilibria in graphical games parameterized by the treewidth w of the underlying graph. It is well-known that the problem of computing pure Nash equilibria is NP-hard in general, but in polynomial time when restricted to games of bounded treewidth.
Antonis Thomas, Jan van Leeuwen
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Quantifying Commitment in Nash Equilibria

International Game Theory Review, 2017
To quantify a player’s commitment in a given Nash equilibrium of a finite dynamic game, we map the corresponding normal-form game to a “canonical extension,” which allows each player to adjust his or her move with a certain probability. The commitment measure relates to the average overall adjustment probabilities for which the given Nash equilibrium ...
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Implementation Via Nash Equilibria

Econometrica, 1992
The author provides a necessary and sufficient condition for a social choice correspondance to be Nash Implementable. With three or more participants this condition is what he calls essential monotonicity.
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The complexity of pure Nash equilibria

Proceedings of the thirty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing, 2004
We investigate from the computational viewpoint multi-player games that are guaranteed to have pure Nash equilibria. We focus on congestion games, and show that a pure Nash equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time in the symmetric network case, while the problem is PLS-complete in general.
Alex Fabrikant, Christos H. Papadimitriou, Kunal Talwar   +2 more
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