Bank Capital and Misconduct Incentives
ABSTRACT This paper studies large banks' incentives to engage in misconduct by abusing their dominant position in the market for loans and by mis‐selling an add‐on financial product to depositors. We draw new connections between stability‐focused prudential regulation and misconduct by studying the impact of higher capital requirements on misconduct ...
Jacob Seifert
wiley +1 more source
Cognitive Radio Simultaneous Spectrum Access/ One-shot Game Modelling
The aim of this work is to asses simultaneous spectrum access situations that may occur in Cognitive Radio (CR) environments. The approach is that of one shot, noncooperative games describing CR interactions.
Cremene, Ligia C. +3 more
core +1 more source
Cross Ownership Versus Merger Under Product Differentiation
ABSTRACT We compare the merger participants' profits under a merger and under cross ownership (CO) in an oligopolistic industry with horizontally differentiated products. We show under Cournot competition that the merger participants would be better off under a symmetric CO than a merger.
Arijit Mukherjee
wiley +1 more source
The impact of advertising in a duopoly model [PDF]
We investigate the impact of advertising in a simple static differentiated duopoly model. First, we consider the Nash equilibrium of the situation in which the duopolistic firms compete simultaneously with two instruments, i.e.
Kooreman, Peter, Schoonbeek, Lambert
core +1 more source
Protecting Intermediate Innovations When Ideas Are Scarce: Patents or Secrecy?
ABSTRACT Patenting an intermediate research innovation can lead to competition for the development of a final commercial innovation and potentially induce wasteful duplicative R&D efforts. This study examines the effects of different protection strategies and patent life on the incentives to protect an intermediate innovation by considering a two‐stage
Bonwoo Koo, Jangho Yang, Brian D. Wright
wiley +1 more source
How to use Rosen's normalised equilibrium to enforce a socially desirable Pareto efficient solution [PDF]
We consider a situation, in which a regulator believes that constraining a complex good created jointly by competitive agents, is socially desirable. Individual levels of outputs that generate the constrained amount of the externality can be computed as ...
Jacek B. Krawczyk, Mabel Tidball
core
Buyer Power and the Effect of Vertical Integration on Innovation
ABSTRACT Our article investigates the impact of vertical integration (without foreclosure) on innovation. We compare cases where either (i) two manufacturers or (ii) a manufacturer and a vertically integrated retailer invest. Then, the independent manufacturer(s) and the retailer bargain over nonlinear contracts before selling to consumers.
Claire Chambolle, Morgane Guignard
wiley +1 more source
Background: In Nigeria, there is a plethora of evaluators found in the over 90 universities, specialised educational institutions and private research organisations.
Denis Jobin, Zachary Lawal
doaj +1 more source
Remarks on Nash equilibria for games with additively coupled payoffs (revision, previous title: An unusual Nash equilibrium result and its application to games with allocations in infinite dimensions) [PDF]
If the payoffs of a game are affine, then they are additively coupled. In this situation both the Weierstrass theorem and the Bauer maximum principle can be used to produce existence results for a Nash equilibrium, since each player is faced with an ...
Balder, E.J.
core
Serial Investing and Strategic Commitment in Markets With Unknown Competitors
ABSTRACT We study how serial investors who regularly face unknown competitors attempt to make their projects dominant. Innovating in new markets often involves uncertainty over the nature of the final product and who the key competitors will be. Such projects also have long‐term funding needs, so a commitment to provide the necessary funds imparts a ...
Naveen Khanna, Richmond Mathews
wiley +1 more source

