Results 81 to 90 of about 127,162 (255)
Doves and hawks in economics revisited. An evolutionary quantum game theory-based analysis of financial crises [PDF]
, 2009 The last financial and economic crisis demonstrated the dysfunctional long-term effects of aggressive behaviour in financial markets. Yet, evolutionary game theory predicts that under the condition of strategic dependence a certain degree of aggressive ...
Axelrod +61 more
core +2 more sources
Power Allocation Games in Interference Relay Channels: Existence Analysis of Nash Equilibria
EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking, 2010 We consider a network composed of two interfering point-to-point links where the two transmitters can exploit one common relay node to improve their individual transmission rate.
Belmega ElenaVeronica +2 more
doaj
Late payments, higher prices? An experimental investigation of competitive procurement
Decision Sciences, EarlyView.Abstract The decision to pay one's supplier late is commonplace across global supply chains and, arguably, a key challenge for many businesses. In a multiple‐methods study, we contribute to the literature by documenting important empirical and anecdotal features about the likelihood and severity of late payments, formulating and solving a theoretical ...
Matthew J. Walker, Kyle Hyndman
wiley +1 more source
The Supercore for Normal Form Games [PDF]
We study the supercore of a system derived from a normal form game. For the case of a finite game with pure strategies, we define a sequence of games and show that the supercore of that system coincides with the set of Nash equilibrium strategy profiles ...
Iñarra García, María Elena +2 more
core
Cross‐border reciprocal bartering in public–private tetradic networks
Decision Sciences, EarlyView.Abstract Under the background of semiconductor and vaccine shortages during COVID‐19‐driven supply chain disruptions, this article adopts a multimethodological approach to investigate strategic solutions for cross‐border scarce goods bartering in a public–private (P–P) tetradic reciprocal network, which involves two pairs of P–P collaborative dyads ...
Jiuh‐Biing Sheu +2 more
wiley +1 more source
Bertrand-Edgeworth markets with increasing marginal costs and voluntary trading: Experimental evidence [PDF]
, 2016 Price competition with increasing marginal costs, though relevant for many markets, appears as an under-researched field in the experimental oligopoly literature. We provide results from an experiment that varies the number of firms as well as the demand
Jacobs, Martin, Requate, Till
core
Cuadernos de Economía, 1996 ¿Cuál será el comportamiento de equilibrio de los agentes de más altos ante las amenzas de la subversión a sus vidas y a su patrimonio? En el contexto de un modelo de teoría de juegos, una de las dos estrategias que se discuten, pagar el "contrato de ...
Salazar Boris, Castillo María del Pilar
doaj
The attack‐and‐defense conflict with the gun‐and‐butter dilemma
Economic Inquiry, EarlyView.Abstract We analyze a general equilibrium model of attack and defense with production. One attacker and one defender allocate fixed endowments between producing butter and guns. We characterize the unique interior and unique corner equilibrium, and find that (i) the defenders may spend more resources on conflict than the attacker even without loss ...
Subhasish M. Chowdhury, Iryna Topolyan
wiley +1 more source
The Economic History Review, EarlyView.Abstract After the Second World War, family allowances became a cornerstone of social spending in western Europe. Whilst religion is often highlighted as a driver of this policy, the role of political Catholicism remains contested, particularly in southern Europe.
Guillem Verd‐Llabrés
wiley +1 more source
Equilibrium Solution in a Game between a Cooperative and its Members [PDF]
In the paper a game-theoretical model is set up to describe the conflict situation in which the members of a marketing cooperative may take advantage of an external market price, higher than that offered by the cooperative.
Antonino Scarelli +3 more
core +1 more source