Results 121 to 130 of about 638 (172)
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Goading or Guiding? Cognitivism, Non-Cognitivism, and Practical Reasoning
Sats, 2013Teemu Toppinen
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Non-Cognitivism and Quasi-Realism
2011AbstractThis chapter considers Non-Cognitivism and Quasi-Realism. According to Non-Cognitivists, normative claims are not intended to state facts, except perhaps in some minimal sense. Morality essentially involves certain kinds of desire, or other conative attitude. For Expressivists, such attitudes are expressed by moral claims.
Samuel Scheffler, Parfit Derek
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Non‐Cognitivism and Inconsistency
The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 1995A popular objection to ethical noncognitivism is that it fails to account for the realist appearance of moral discourse. This paper focuses on one feature of this appearance: Our tendency to seek consistency among our moral views. Contrary to what has been argued, I hold that noncognitivists can rationalize this practice. In support of this position, I
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Asian Philosophy, 2014
The purpose of this essay is twofold. First, I plan to argue that in light of Buddhist epistemology and metaphysics, it would be an inherent contradiction to the Buddhist tradition as whole to defend the cognitivist view that moral knowledge is possible.
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The purpose of this essay is twofold. First, I plan to argue that in light of Buddhist epistemology and metaphysics, it would be an inherent contradiction to the Buddhist tradition as whole to defend the cognitivist view that moral knowledge is possible.
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2009
Abstract We have now examined the main statements of non-cognitivism. This chapter mentions some re-statements and defences that try to answer objections to Stevenson’s and Hare’s arguments. After a period of declining interest, the study of meta-ethical questions revived in the last quarter of the twentieth century, and a short ...
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Abstract We have now examined the main statements of non-cognitivism. This chapter mentions some re-statements and defences that try to answer objections to Stevenson’s and Hare’s arguments. After a period of declining interest, the study of meta-ethical questions revived in the last quarter of the twentieth century, and a short ...
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Inquiry, 2001
This essay offers a defence of the non-cognitivist approach to the interpretation of moral judgments as disguised imperatives corresponding to social rules. It addresses the body of criticism that faced R. M. Hare, and that currently faces moral anti-realists, on two levels, by providing a full semantic analysis of evaluative judgments and by arguing ...
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This essay offers a defence of the non-cognitivist approach to the interpretation of moral judgments as disguised imperatives corresponding to social rules. It addresses the body of criticism that faced R. M. Hare, and that currently faces moral anti-realists, on two levels, by providing a full semantic analysis of evaluative judgments and by arguing ...
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Hare: A Defence of Non-Cognitivism
2009Abstract One might regard Hare as a successor to emotivism who offers an improved version of non-cognitivism, in opposition to both naturalism and the non-naturalist cognitivism of Moore and Ross. A critic may ask whether and in what ways Hare’s prescriptivism improves on emotivism, and whether the improvements allow Hare to answer the ...
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Theoria, 2007
Abstract: In this paper I defend against a certain objection the view that it is possible to account for validity and kindred notions for moral language within a non‐cognitivist framework by appeal to the descriptive meaning of moral terms. The objection is that such an account leads to an asymmetry in the accounts it offers for synonymy in different ...
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Abstract: In this paper I defend against a certain objection the view that it is possible to account for validity and kindred notions for moral language within a non‐cognitivist framework by appeal to the descriptive meaning of moral terms. The objection is that such an account leads to an asymmetry in the accounts it offers for synonymy in different ...
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Wittgenstein’s ‘Non-Cognitivism’ – Explained and Vindicated
Synthese, 2007The later Wittgenstein advanced a revolutionary but puzzling conception of how philosophy ought to be practised: Philosophical problems are not to be coped with by establishing substantive claims or devising explanations or theories. Instead, philosophical questions ought to be treated 'like an illness'.
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Non-cognitivism and Motivation
2009It is usually thought, following Hume, that considerations to do with motivation favour non-cognitivism over cognitivism about moral judgements. Hume’s motivation argument was that non-cognitivism does better than cognitivism at respecting the common observation that there is an immediate or internal connection between moral judgements and motivation ...
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