Results 131 to 140 of about 638 (172)

NON-COGNITIVISM, TRUTH AND LOGIC

Philosophical Studies, 1997
L'A. defend la these selon laquelle l'ethique non-cognitiviste developpee par A. Gibbard ne peut fournir une approche adequate du comportement logique des enonces normatifs. Examinant les caracteristiques de la verite, l'A. montre que la position de Gibbard evite le probleme fregeen de l'expression de l'emotion souleve par P.
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Mill's Metaethical Non-cognitivism

Utilitas, 2017
In section I, I lay out key components of my favoured non-cognitivist interpretation of Mill's metaethics. In section II, I respond to several objections to this style of interpretation posed by Christopher Macleod. In section III, I respond to David Brink's treatment of the well-known ‘competent judges’ passage in Mill'sUtilitarianism.
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If Not Non-Cognitivism, Then What?

2009
According to Michael Smith, the big issue in metaethics (what he calls “The Moral Problem”) is how to accept the seemingly true premises of Hume’s Motivation Argument while fending off its non-cognitivist conclusion, a conclusion that Smith takes to be both repugnant and false (Smith, 1994, The Moral Problem, henceforward MP).
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Non-cognitivism: a new defense

The Journal of Value Inquiry, 1997
L'A. developpe un nouvel argument en faveur d'une caracterisation non-cognitiviste du langage moral. Decivant une version contemporaine du realisme moral fondee sur la semantique de Kripke et Putnam, l'A. montre que celle-ci rend obsolete l'argument de la question ouverte developpe par Moore, d'une part, et qu'un nouveau probleme s'oppose a la ...
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From non-cognitivism of men to non-cognitivism of machines: paths for the use of automated judicial decisions

2021
Vive-se cada vez mais em um mundo tecnorregulado, em que os softwares de inteligência artificial são os responsáveis por muitas decisões que impactam a vida dos indivíduos. As decisões automatizadas já são uma realidade, inclusive no Poder Judiciário.
Borghetti Cantali, Fernanda, Engelmann, Wilson   +1 more
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Natural Morality, Descriptivism, and Non-Cognitivism

Philosophia, 2015
I attempt to identify a problem running through the foundation of R. M. Hare’s ethical prescriptivism and the more recent sentimentalism/ethical expressivism of Simon Blackburn. The non-cognitivism to which Hare and Blackburn’s approaches are committed renders them unable to establish stable contents for basic moral principles and, thus, incapable of ...
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A Rebuttal of Pollock's ‘Refutation’ of Non-cognitivism

Mind, 1976
In 'Freedom and Universalizability' (Mind, April 1973), Lansing Pollock constructs an argument in support of a moral principle (the principle of equal freedom), which he offers as a counter-example to the noncognitivist thesis that the justification of any moral principle must itself contain at least one moral premise.
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Frege, the Proliferation of Force, and Non-cognitivism

Mind, 1984
But these two inferences could not proceed on the same principle if we'... had to recognize a special way of judging for the negative case'. In inference (i), assertoric force attaches to the first premise as a whole and to the second premise as a whole, and the thought expressed in the second premise coincides with the thought expressed in the ...
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The Refutation of Non-cognitivism: Dorr’s Wishful Thinking

Philosophia (United States)
Abstract As commonly understood, Cian Dorr influentially argues that non-cognitivism must be rejected because it classifies instances of rational inference as wishful thinking. This is wrong. Dorr’s argument, as just described, with its appeal to the notion of wishful thinking, does not refute any version of non-cognitivism. But there
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The Motivation Argument for Non-Cognitivism

2009
This passage from Hume’s Treatise is often cited as the inspiration for the Motivation Argument for non-cognitivism, an argument that can be stated more explicitly as follows: (1) Actions are the product of agents’ desires about the ways things are to be and their beliefs about what they can do to make things those ways.
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