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An outside individual option increases optimism and facilitates collaboration when groups form flexibly. [PDF]
Nat CommunMori R, Hanaki N, Kameda T.
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Noncooperative Differential Games
Milan Journal of Mathematics, 2011zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
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2017
This chapter discusses the key principles of noncooperative game theory with the aid of several examples. To characterize a game, several items must be specified; for example, the players are the agents that make decisions. For a mathematical solution to a game, it is also important to make assumptions on the player's rationality, regarding questions ...
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This chapter discusses the key principles of noncooperative game theory with the aid of several examples. To characterize a game, several items must be specified; for example, the players are the agents that make decisions. For a mathematical solution to a game, it is also important to make assumptions on the player's rationality, regarding questions ...
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Noncooperative facility location games
Operations Research Letters, 2007zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
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Stability in Noncooperative Games
Operations Research, 1971This paper presents definitions for stability of equilibrium points in non-cooperative N-person games over compact metric spaces. It then derives conditions for stability, assuming certain properties of payoffs in games over Euclidean spaces. Finally, computational implications of the theory are noted.
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Ideal equilibria in noncooperative multicriteria games
Mathematical Methods of Operations Research (ZOR), 2000The authors consider finite noncooperative multicriteria games in the form of a tuple \(G\) = \(\langle N, (X_i)_{i\in N},(u_i)_{i\in N}\rangle\) with a finite set \(N\) of players, where for \(i\in N\), \(X_i\) is a finite set of Player \(i\)'s pure strategies, and \(u_i = (u_{ik})_{k=1}^{r(i)}\) is a vector payoff function of Player \(i\) defined on \
Voorneveld, M. +2 more
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Layers of noncooperative games
Nonlinear Analysis: Theory, Methods & Applications, 2009zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Dshalalow, Jewgeni H., Ke, Hao-Jan
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2016
Playing is something profoundly human, and the ability to play is tightly tied to the intelligence of human beings, to their capability of thinking foresightedly and strategically, of choosing a particularly profitable move among all possible moves, of anticipating possible response moves by their adversaries, and thus to their capability of maximizing
Piotr Faliszewski +2 more
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Playing is something profoundly human, and the ability to play is tightly tied to the intelligence of human beings, to their capability of thinking foresightedly and strategically, of choosing a particularly profitable move among all possible moves, of anticipating possible response moves by their adversaries, and thus to their capability of maximizing
Piotr Faliszewski +2 more
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Cooperative Outcomes through Noncooperative Games
Games and Economic Behavior, 1994Stable solution sets describe a reasonable outcome of a cooperative game, i.e., of a conflict in which participants are free to form coalitions. One might expect that if coalitions are not allowed, outcome will be different; sometimes outcomes are indeed different, but the paper under review gives a reasonable example of a non-cooperative game for ...
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Nonconvexity in noncooperative game theory
International Journal of Game Theory, 1989zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
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