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Ideal equilibria in noncooperative multicriteria games
Mathematical Methods of Operations Research (ZOR), 2000The authors consider finite noncooperative multicriteria games in the form of a tuple \(G\) = \(\langle N, (X_i)_{i\in N},(u_i)_{i\in N}\rangle\) with a finite set \(N\) of players, where for \(i\in N\), \(X_i\) is a finite set of Player \(i\)'s pure strategies, and \(u_i = (u_{ik})_{k=1}^{r(i)}\) is a vector payoff function of Player \(i\) defined on \
Mark Voorneveld +2 more
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On noncooperative equilibria in ordinal games
SMC'98 Conference Proceedings. 1998 IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics (Cat. No.98CH36218), 2002This paper aims at studying noncooperative equilibria in ordinal games. We first define the notion of noncooperative equilibrium in ordinal games, study its properties, and then propose an algorithm for finding out all ordinal noncooperative equilibria in two-person and three-person ordinal games.
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2017
This chapter discusses the key principles of noncooperative game theory with the aid of several examples. To characterize a game, several items must be specified; for example, the players are the agents that make decisions. For a mathematical solution to a game, it is also important to make assumptions on the player's rationality, regarding questions ...
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This chapter discusses the key principles of noncooperative game theory with the aid of several examples. To characterize a game, several items must be specified; for example, the players are the agents that make decisions. For a mathematical solution to a game, it is also important to make assumptions on the player's rationality, regarding questions ...
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A Strong Equilibrium in Noncooperative Games
Computational Mathematics and Modeling, 2002This research work suggests a new concept of strong equilibrium in some classes of noncooperative games on compact sets having pure strategies. In order to justify it, the author indicates examples of static and differential games and uses pertinent references.
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Noncooperative Games for Subcontracting Operations
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2013Consider a set of manufacturers, all of which can subcontract part of their workload to a third party. For simplicity, we assume that every manufacturer as well as the third party each possess a single production facility. Each manufacturer has to decide the amount of workload to be subcontracted so as to minimize the completion time of his in-house ...
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A solution for noncooperative games
Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 1982In this paper, we study solutions of strict noncooperative games that are played just once. The players are not allowed to communicate with each other. The main ingredient of our theory is the concept of rationalizing a set of strategies for each player of a game.
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Nonconvexity in noncooperative game theory
International Journal of Game Theory, 1989zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
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Limit Consistent Solutions in Noncooperative Games
Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 1998zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Perea y Monsuwé, A., Peters, H.
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2016
Playing is something profoundly human, and the ability to play is tightly tied to the intelligence of human beings, to their capability of thinking foresightedly and strategically, of choosing a particularly profitable move among all possible moves, of anticipating possible response moves by their adversaries, and thus to their capability of maximizing
Piotr Faliszewski +2 more
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Playing is something profoundly human, and the ability to play is tightly tied to the intelligence of human beings, to their capability of thinking foresightedly and strategically, of choosing a particularly profitable move among all possible moves, of anticipating possible response moves by their adversaries, and thus to their capability of maximizing
Piotr Faliszewski +2 more
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International Journal of Game Theory, 1971
Noncooperative games in normal form and in characteristic function form are considered. The supergame of the noncooperative game is defined as an infinite sequence of plays of the original game. The notions of strong Pareto equilibrium point (s.p.e.p.) and essential core are introduced. A relationship between the essential core of a noncooperative game
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Noncooperative games in normal form and in characteristic function form are considered. The supergame of the noncooperative game is defined as an infinite sequence of plays of the original game. The notions of strong Pareto equilibrium point (s.p.e.p.) and essential core are introduced. A relationship between the essential core of a noncooperative game
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