Results 161 to 170 of about 825 (203)

Group Formation and the Evolution of Human Social Organization. [PDF]

Perspect Psychol Sci
De Dreu CKW, Gross J, Romano A.
europepmc   +1 more source

Attitudinal Analysis of Vaccination Effects: Egoism vs Altruism

, 2022
Lee S, Ku D, Kim G, Peck KR, Park IK, Chang R, Kim D.   +6 more
europepmc   +1 more source

Social dilemma for 30 years: Progress, framework, and future based on CiteSpace analysis. [PDF]

Medicine (Baltimore)
Gao J, Geng Y, Jiang X, Li J, Yan Y.
europepmc   +1 more source

A Narrative Review of Dental General Anaesthesia in Children With Special Health Care Needs. [PDF]

Int Dent J
Yang J, Zheng X, He Y, Cao D, Zhang X, Chen Y, Tu Y.   +6 more
europepmc   +1 more source

NONCOOPERATIVE GAMES WITH NONCOMPACT JOINT STRATEGIES SETS: INCREASING BEST RESPONSES AND APPROXIMATION TO EQUILIBRIUM POINTS

, 2011
Rosa María Flores-Hernández, Raúl Montes-de-Oca   +1 more
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The Dark Side of Moral Conviction-Integrating Political Psychology, Cognitive Science, and Neuroscience. [PDF]

Ann N Y Acad Sci
Decety J, Cohen MS, Cao Q.
europepmc   +1 more source

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Noncooperative Differential Games

Milan Journal of Mathematics, 2011
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
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Noncooperative Games

2017
This chapter discusses the key principles of noncooperative game theory with the aid of several examples. To characterize a game, several items must be specified; for example, the players are the agents that make decisions. For a mathematical solution to a game, it is also important to make assumptions on the player's rationality, regarding questions ...
openaire   +2 more sources

Noncooperative facility location games

Operations Research Letters, 2007
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
openaire   +3 more sources

Stability in Noncooperative Games

Operations Research, 1971
This paper presents definitions for stability of equilibrium points in non-cooperative N-person games over compact metric spaces. It then derives conditions for stability, assuming certain properties of payoffs in games over Euclidean spaces. Finally, computational implications of the theory are noted.
openaire   +1 more source