Results 181 to 190 of about 17,926 (293)

High Standards

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Evaluative adjectives are gradable. The standard for falling under a gradable adjective “F” is either context‐relative or absolute. Some philosophers have recently used general linguistic tests to argue that “rational” and (moral) “good” are maximum‐degree absolute gradable adjectives: Only what's perfectly morally good strictly counts as ...
Pekka Väyrynen
wiley   +1 more source

Reclaiming Justice as Lived Praxis: A Phenomenological Critique of Social and Relational Justice in Nursing Practice. [PDF]

Nurs Philos
Tembo AC.
europepmc   +1 more source

Pain Intensities

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Recent philosophical work on pain distinguishes a variety of pain qualities and the mechanisms that give rise to them, but pain intensity remains a monolithic notion difficult to account for in reductive terms. The reason for this difficulty is that pain intensity is not a unitary phenomenal magnitude; pain is a complex experience featuring ...
Kim Soland
wiley   +1 more source

Representationalism can connect neuroscience and philosophy. [PDF]

Front Cognit
Kok A.
europepmc   +1 more source

Parity and the Permissivism Puzzle: A Defense of Epistemic Options

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Moral philosophers generally affirm that there are moral options: a single person sometimes has multiple morally permissible actions at a time. But epistemologists generally deny that there are epistemic options: a single person never has multiple epistemically permissible doxastic attitudes at a time. This asymmetry is striking.
Chris Tucker, Elizabeth Jackson
wiley   +1 more source

Kidney stone disease: phenomenological perspectives. [PDF]

Med Health Care Philos
Suijker CA, van Mazijk C, Roemeling S.
europepmc   +1 more source

Consent and the Formation of Preferences

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Under ideal conditions, explicit consent and related actions usually change the moral facts in a distinctive way: they make something permissible that was previously impermissible. But they don't do this if the consent is coerced. And it seems they also don't do it if the preferences on which the consent is based were formed in particular ways:
Richard Pettigrew
wiley   +1 more source

Attending With Feeling: The Normative Structure of Emotional Attention

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT In assessing an emotional episode, we can ask whether the intentional object of the emotion is that which the subject ought to be paying attending to. If the intentional object is not that which the subject should be paying attention to, what should be the target of normative assessment?
Juliette Vazard
wiley   +1 more source

Hallucinations at the interface of philosophy and the empirical sciences. [PDF]

Front Psychol
Dolcini N.
europepmc   +1 more source

What's Wrong With “Conceptual Amelioration”?

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Conceptual amelioration aims to make the world a more just place by ameliorating our concepts. I offer three arguments against this enterprise as currently practiced to show how social philosophy aimed at producing social change can be better practiced. First, ameliorators often fail to provide plausible stories to vindicate their claims about
Lidal Dror
wiley   +1 more source