Results 211 to 220 of about 5,277,294 (228)

Existence of Risk Strategy Equilibrium in Games Having No Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium

2009
Two key properties defining an intelligent agent are reactive and pro-active. Before designing an intelligent agent for any multi-agent system, we need to first understand how agents should behave and interact in that particular application, which can be done by modelling the application as a game . To analyze these games and to understand how decision-
Ka-man Lam, Ho-fung Leung
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On the existence of almost-pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in n-person finite games

Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, 2006
This paper gives wide characterization of n-person non-coalitional games with finite players’ strategy spaces and payoff functions having some concavity or convexity properties. The characterization is done in terms of the existence of two-point-strategy Nash equilibria, that is equilibria consisting only of mixed strategies with supports being one or ...
Wojciech Polowczuk, Piotr Wiecek, Tadeusz Radzik   +2 more
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The existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in a discrete ponds dilemma

Games and Economic Behavior
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Vasily V. Gusev, Alexander Nesterov, Mikhail Reshetov, Alex Suzdaltsev   +3 more
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Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibrium Points in Non-Anonymous Games

1997
We present an example of a nonaiomic game without pure Nash equilibria. In the example, the set of players is modelled on the Lebesgue unit interval with an equicontinuous family of payoff functions, and an identical action set given by [–1,1]. This example is sharper than that recently presented by Rath-Sun-Yamashige in that the relationship between ...
M. Ali Khan, Kali P. Rath, Yeneng Sun
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Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium and Simultaneous-Move Games with Complete Information

2016
This chapter analyzes behavior in relatively simple strategic settings: simultaneous-move games of complete information. Let us define the two building blocks of this chapter: best responses and Nash equilibrium.
Felix Munoz-Garcia, Daniel Toro-Gonzalez
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The uniqueness of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in rent-seeking games with risk-averse players

Public Choice, 2009
This article proves that if each player’s measure of absolute risk aversion is nonincreasing in his/her wealth, then there exists a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the general rent-seeking game, where risk-averse players can coexist with risk-neutral players, attitude toward risk can differ among players, and concave production functions for ...
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Pure-Strategy ε-Nash Equilibrium inn-Person Nonzero-Sum Discontinuous Games

Games and Economic Behavior, 1997
Abstract In this paper we considern-person nonzero-sum games where the strategy spaces of players are compact subsets ofRs. The main result states that if the payoff functions are semicontinuous and strongly quasi-concave then an e-Nash equilibrium in pure strategies exists for every positive e.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: C72.
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Pure-strategy ε-Nash equilibrium in two-person non-zero-sum games

Games and Economic Behavior, 1991
Abstract This paper considers two-person non-zero-sum games where the strategy spaces of players are compact intervals of real numbers and the payoff functions are upper semicontinuous . Under certain quasi-concavity assumptions, it is proved that such games possess e- Nash equilibria in pure strategies for every e > 0.
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On the Existence and Uniqueness of Pure‐Strategy Nash Equilibrium in Asymmetric Rent‐Seeking Contests

Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2008
AbstractThere can be three types of heterogeneity among players in a rent‐seeking contest. First, effectiveness of player's effort on the winning probabilities may differ among players. Secondly, players may evaluate the rent or prize of the rent‐seeking contest differently. Thirdly, players may face different financial constraints. This article proves
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Discontinuous Payoffs, Shared Resources, and Games of Fiscal Competition: Existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium

Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2007
AbstractWe define a class of games with discontinuous payoffs that we call shared resource games and establish a pure strategy Nash equilibrium existence theorem for these games. We then apply this result to a canonical game of fiscal competition for mobile capital. Other applications are also discussed. Our result for the mobile capital game holds for
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