Results 251 to 260 of about 685,240 (295)
Repeated proximity games [PDF]
International Journal of Game Theory, 1998 zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Renault, Jérôme, Tomala, Tristan
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SSRN Electronic Journal, 2021
This paper uses a laboratory experiment to study beliefs and their relationship to action and strategy choices in finitely and indefinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma games. We find subjects' beliefs about the other player's action are accurate despite some systematic deviations corresponding to early pessimism in the indefinitely repeated game and ...
Aoyagi, Masaki +2 more
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This paper uses a laboratory experiment to study beliefs and their relationship to action and strategy choices in finitely and indefinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma games. We find subjects' beliefs about the other player's action are accurate despite some systematic deviations corresponding to early pessimism in the indefinitely repeated game and ...
Aoyagi, Masaki +2 more
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Econometrica, 1985
Subgame perfect equilibria of finitely repeated games are studied. A limit ''folk theorem'' is proved: under certain weak conditions, any feasible and individually rational payoff of the one-shot game can be approximated by the average payoff in a perfect equilibrium of a repeated game with a sufficiently long horizon.
Benoit, Jean-Pierre, Krishna, Vijay
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Subgame perfect equilibria of finitely repeated games are studied. A limit ''folk theorem'' is proved: under certain weak conditions, any feasible and individually rational payoff of the one-shot game can be approximated by the average payoff in a perfect equilibrium of a repeated game with a sufficiently long horizon.
Benoit, Jean-Pierre, Krishna, Vijay
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Econometrica, 2003
Consider a two-player discounted infinitely repeated game. A player's belief is a probability distribution over the opponent's repeated game strategies. This paper shows that, for a large class of repeated games, there are no beliefs that satisfy three conditions, learnability, consistency, and a diversity condition, CS.
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Consider a two-player discounted infinitely repeated game. A player's belief is a probability distribution over the opponent's repeated game strategies. This paper shows that, for a large class of repeated games, there are no beliefs that satisfy three conditions, learnability, consistency, and a diversity condition, CS.
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Renegotiation in Finitely Repeated Games [PDF]
Econometrica, 1993 Summary: Perfect equilibria of finitely repeated games may be vulnerable to the possibility of renegotiation among players. We study the limiting properties of the set of payoffs from equilibria that are immune to renegotiation. Our main result is that the limit of the set of payoffs from renegotiation proof equilibria is either a singleton or a ...
Benoit, Jean-Pierre, Krishna, Vijay
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SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization, 1988
Finite extensive form games in which each player's information set may contain nodes lying on a single directed path are considered. The existence of a Nash equilibrium point in randomized strategies is shown. Some examples are considered.
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Finite extensive form games in which each player's information set may contain nodes lying on a single directed path are considered. The existence of a Nash equilibrium point in randomized strategies is shown. Some examples are considered.
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2015
In this chapter repeated and dynamic games will be discussed in which the players know the strategy sets and payoff functions of all players, that is, the game has complete information. It is also assumed that at each time period each player knows the complete history of the game which consists of the past strategy selections and corresponding payoff ...
Akio Matsumoto, Ferenc Szidarovszky
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In this chapter repeated and dynamic games will be discussed in which the players know the strategy sets and payoff functions of all players, that is, the game has complete information. It is also assumed that at each time period each player knows the complete history of the game which consists of the past strategy selections and corresponding payoff ...
Akio Matsumoto, Ferenc Szidarovszky
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Defensive Plays in Repeated Games
International Game Theory Review, 2019In obtaining the classical folk theorems for repeated games, the players must collectively coordinate their actions, even after someone deviates. In this paper, we explore the impacts of defensive plays on the set of equilibrium payoffs when all players have sufficiently high discount factor.
Miguel Aramendía, Quan Wen
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2015
Three leading experts have produced a landmark work based on a set of working papers published by the Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) at the Université Catholique de Louvain in 1994 under the title 'Repeated Games', which holds almost mythic status among game theorists.
Jean-François Mertens +2 more
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Three leading experts have produced a landmark work based on a set of working papers published by the Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) at the Université Catholique de Louvain in 1994 under the title 'Repeated Games', which holds almost mythic status among game theorists.
Jean-François Mertens +2 more
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Continuous Time Repeated Games
International Economic Review, 1993Summary: We develop a model of strategic behaviour in continuous time games of complete information, which includes conventional repeated games in discrete time as a special case. The model developed here admits a very large class of strategies, that allows one to extend the repeated game model to continuous time. The set of equilibria in this game may
Bergin, James, MacLeod, W Bentley
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