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Econometrica, 2003
Consider a two-player discounted infinitely repeated game. A player's belief is a probability distribution over the opponent's repeated game strategies. This paper shows that, for a large class of repeated games, there are no beliefs that satisfy three conditions, learnability, consistency, and a diversity condition, CS.
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Consider a two-player discounted infinitely repeated game. A player's belief is a probability distribution over the opponent's repeated game strategies. This paper shows that, for a large class of repeated games, there are no beliefs that satisfy three conditions, learnability, consistency, and a diversity condition, CS.
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Defensive Plays in Repeated Games
International Game Theory Review, 2019In obtaining the classical folk theorems for repeated games, the players must collectively coordinate their actions, even after someone deviates. In this paper, we explore the impacts of defensive plays on the set of equilibrium payoffs when all players have sufficiently high discount factor.
Miguel Aramendía, Quan Wen
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Continuous Time Repeated Games
International Economic Review, 1993Summary: We develop a model of strategic behaviour in continuous time games of complete information, which includes conventional repeated games in discrete time as a special case. The model developed here admits a very large class of strategies, that allows one to extend the repeated game model to continuous time. The set of equilibria in this game may
Bergin, James, MacLeod, W Bentley
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SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization, 1988
Finite extensive form games in which each player's information set may contain nodes lying on a single directed path are considered. The existence of a Nash equilibrium point in randomized strategies is shown. Some examples are considered.
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Finite extensive form games in which each player's information set may contain nodes lying on a single directed path are considered. The existence of a Nash equilibrium point in randomized strategies is shown. Some examples are considered.
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Repeated Games with Bounded Entropy
Games and Economic Behavior, 2000zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Abraham Neyman, Daijiro Okada
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2015
In this chapter repeated and dynamic games will be discussed in which the players know the strategy sets and payoff functions of all players, that is, the game has complete information. It is also assumed that at each time period each player knows the complete history of the game which consists of the past strategy selections and corresponding payoff ...
Akio Matsumoto, Ferenc Szidarovszky
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In this chapter repeated and dynamic games will be discussed in which the players know the strategy sets and payoff functions of all players, that is, the game has complete information. It is also assumed that at each time period each player knows the complete history of the game which consists of the past strategy selections and corresponding payoff ...
Akio Matsumoto, Ferenc Szidarovszky
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2015
Three leading experts have produced a landmark work based on a set of working papers published by the Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) at the Université Catholique de Louvain in 1994 under the title 'Repeated Games', which holds almost mythic status among game theorists.
Jean-François Mertens +2 more
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Three leading experts have produced a landmark work based on a set of working papers published by the Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) at the Université Catholique de Louvain in 1994 under the title 'Repeated Games', which holds almost mythic status among game theorists.
Jean-François Mertens +2 more
+4 more sources
On Repeated Games with Complete Information
Mathematics of Operations Research, 1986We consider N person repeated games with complete information and standard signalling. We first prove several properties of the sets of feasible payoffs and Nash equilibrium payoffs for the n-stage game and for the λ-discounted game. In the second part we determine the set of equilibrium payoffs for the Prisoner's Dilemma corresponding to the critical
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