Results 11 to 20 of about 1,635,028 (357)
Physics Letters A, 2002 In a two-stage repeated classical game of prisoners' dilemma the knowledge that both players will defect in the second stage makes the players to defect in the first stage as well.
A. Iqbal +7 more
core +10 more sources
Equilibrium Behaviors in Repeated Games [PDF]
Journal of Economic Theory, 2020 We examine a patient player's behavior when he can build reputations in front of a sequence of myopic opponents. With positive probability, the patient player is a commitment type who plays his Stackelberg action in every period. We characterize the patient player's action frequencies in equilibrium.
Yingkai Li, Harry Pei
semanticscholar +5 more sources
Backward Induction for Repeated Games [PDF]
Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science, 2018 We present a method of backward induction for computing approximate subgame perfect Nash equilibria of infinitely repeated games with discounted payoffs. This uses the selection monad transformer, combined with the searchable set monad viewed as a notion
Jules Hedges
doaj +6 more sources
From repeated games to Brownian games [PDF]
Annales de l'Institut Henri Poincare (B) Probability and Statistics, 1999 zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
B De Meyer
openalex +5 more sources
Learning With Repeated-Game Strategies [PDF]
Frontiers in Neuroscience, 2014 We use the self-tuning Experience Weighted Attraction model with repeated-game strategies as a computer testbed to examine the relative frequency, speed of convergence and progression of a set of repeated-game strategies in four symmetric 2x2 games ...
Christos A. Ioannou, Julian eRomero
doaj +6 more sources
When to (or not to) trust intelligent machines: Insights from an evolutionary game theory analysis of trust in repeated games [PDF]
Cognitive Systems Research, 2021 The Anh Han +2 more
openalex +3 more sources
Repeated Games Played in a Network [PDF]
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2008 Delayed perfect monitoring in an infinitely repeated discounted game is modelled by allocating the players to a connected and undirected network. Players observe their immediate neighbors’ behavior only, but communicate over time the repeated game’s ...
Markus Kinateder
core +7 more sources
REPEATED GAMES WITH PROBABILISTIC HORIZON [PDF]
Mathematical Social Sciences, 2005 Repeated games with probabilistic horizon are defined as those games where players have a common probability structure over the length of the game's repetition, T.
Amparo Urbano, Ivan Arribas
core +4 more sources
Testing threats in repeated games [PDF]
Journal of Economic Theory, 2004 zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Ran Spiegler
openalex +4 more sources
Awareness in repeated games [PDF]
Meteor Research Memorandum, 2009 In this paper we provide a framework to reason about limited awareness of the action space in finitely repeated games. Our framework is rich enough to capture the full strategic aspect of limited awareness in a dynamic setting, taking into account the possibility that agents might want to reveal or conceal actions to their opponent or that they might ...
Friederike Mengel +2 more
openalex +5 more sources