Results 21 to 30 of about 1,383,828 (332)
Equilibrium behaviors in repeated games [PDF]
Journal of Economic Theory, 2021 We examine a patient player's behavior when he can build reputations in front of a sequence of myopic opponents. With positive probability, the patient player is a commitment type who plays his Stackelberg action in every period. We characterize the patient player's action frequencies in equilibrium.
Yingkai Li, Harry Pei
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When to (or not to) trust intelligent machines: Insights from an evolutionary game theory analysis of trust in repeated games [PDF]
Cognitive Systems Research, 2020 The actions of intelligent agents, such as chatbots, recommender systems, and virtual assistants are typically not fully transparent to the user. Consequently, using such an agent involves the user exposing themselves to the risk that the agent may act ...
H. Anh, Cédric Perret, Simon T. Powers
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The Effect of Sequentiality on Cooperation in Repeated Games
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2022 Sequentiality of moves in an infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma does not change the conditions under which mutual cooperation can be supported in equilibrium relative to simultaneous decision-making.
Riccardo Ghidoni, S. Suetens
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Economics Letters, 2002 zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Brock, W.A., de Zeeuw, A.J.
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Renegotiation in repeated games [PDF]
Games and Economic Behavior, 1989 zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Farrell, Joseph, Maskin, Eric
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On Nash Equilibrium and Evolutionarily Stable States That Are Not Characterised by the Folk Theorem. [PDF]
PLoS ONE, 2015 In evolutionary game theory, evolutionarily stable states are characterised by the folk theorem because exact solutions to the replicator equation are difficult to obtain. It is generally assumed that the folk theorem, which is the fundamental theory for
Jiawei Li, Graham Kendall
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Private Monitoring and Communication in the Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
Games, 2021 This paper provides a model of the repeated prisoner’s dilemma in which cheap-talk communication is necessary in order to achieve cooperative outcomes in a long-term relationship. The model is one of complete information.
Yu Awaya
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Repeated Games with Bonuses [PDF]
Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 2008 The authors discuss a model of learning and unlearning in infinitely repeated games, in which player 1 receives a bonus, if he plays the same action as in the previous stage. The expected average reward is used as a performance (criterion) measure. The authors show that the game has a value and give conditions for the existence of the so-called simple ...
Schoenmakers, G. +3 more
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Self-Enforcing Price Leadership
Games, 2021 A dynamic Bertrand-duopoly model where price leadership emerges in equilibrium is developed. In the price leadership equilibrium, a firm leads price changes and its competitor always matches in the next period. The firms produce a homogeneous product and
Gustavo Gudino
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A Survey on Entropy and Economic Behaviour
Entropy, 2020 Entropy plays a significant role in the study of games and economic behaviour in several ways. A decision maker faced with an n-fold repetition of a decision-making problem needs to apply strategies that become increasingly complex as n increases.
Ziv Hellman, Ron Peretz
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