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Applications of Repeated Games in Wireless Networks: A Survey
A repeated game is an effective tool to model interactions and conflicts for players aiming to achieve their objectives in a long-term basis. Contrary to static noncooperative games that model an interaction among players in only one period, in repeated ...
Han, Zhu +5 more
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Existence of equilibria in repeated games with long-run payoffs. [PDF]
Ashkenazi-Golan G +3 more
europepmc +2 more sources
Backward Induction for Repeated Games [PDF]
We present a method of backward induction for computing approximate subgame perfect Nash equilibria of infinitely repeated games with discounted payoffs. This uses the selection monad transformer, combined with the searchable set monad viewed as a notion
Jules Hedges
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Private Monitoring and Communication in the Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
This paper provides a model of the repeated prisoner’s dilemma in which cheap-talk communication is necessary in order to achieve cooperative outcomes in a long-term relationship. The model is one of complete information.
Yu Awaya
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On Nash Equilibrium and Evolutionarily Stable States That Are Not Characterised by the Folk Theorem. [PDF]
In evolutionary game theory, evolutionarily stable states are characterised by the folk theorem because exact solutions to the replicator equation are difficult to obtain. It is generally assumed that the folk theorem, which is the fundamental theory for
Jiawei Li, Graham Kendall
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Large Nonanonymous Repeated Games [PDF]
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Nabil I. Al-Najjar, Rann Smorodinsky
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Self-Enforcing Price Leadership
A dynamic Bertrand-duopoly model where price leadership emerges in equilibrium is developed. In the price leadership equilibrium, a firm leads price changes and its competitor always matches in the next period. The firms produce a homogeneous product and
Gustavo Gudino
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In a two-stage repeated classical game of prisoners' dilemma the knowledge that both players will defect in the second stage makes the players to defect in the first stage as well.
A. Iqbal +7 more
core +4 more sources
Learning in a Hiring Logic and Optimal Contracts
This paper examines a hiring logic problem in which all players involved in this game are exposed to scenarios where they can learn from the changes and these modifications influence their preferences; consequently, their decision-making differs from the
Jose Iranildo Sales +1 more
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A Survey on Entropy and Economic Behaviour
Entropy plays a significant role in the study of games and economic behaviour in several ways. A decision maker faced with an n-fold repetition of a decision-making problem needs to apply strategies that become increasingly complex as n increases.
Ziv Hellman, Ron Peretz
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