Results 21 to 30 of about 1,664,993 (364)
The Effect of Sequentiality on Cooperation in Repeated Games
Sequentiality of moves in an infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma does not change the conditions under which mutual cooperation can be supported in equilibrium relative to simultaneous decision-making.
Riccardo Ghidoni, S. Suetens
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Private Monitoring and Communication in the Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
This paper provides a model of the repeated prisoner’s dilemma in which cheap-talk communication is necessary in order to achieve cooperative outcomes in a long-term relationship. The model is one of complete information.
Yu Awaya
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On Nash Equilibrium and Evolutionarily Stable States That Are Not Characterised by the Folk Theorem. [PDF]
In evolutionary game theory, evolutionarily stable states are characterised by the folk theorem because exact solutions to the replicator equation are difficult to obtain. It is generally assumed that the folk theorem, which is the fundamental theory for
Jiawei Li, Graham Kendall
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Large Nonanonymous Repeated Games [PDF]
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Nabil I. Al-Najjar, Rann Smorodinsky
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Self-Enforcing Price Leadership
A dynamic Bertrand-duopoly model where price leadership emerges in equilibrium is developed. In the price leadership equilibrium, a firm leads price changes and its competitor always matches in the next period. The firms produce a homogeneous product and
Gustavo Gudino
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Evolutionary Stable Strategies in Multistage Games
Direct ESS has some disadvantages, which are seen even in the case of repeated games when the sequence of stage ESSs may not constitute the direct ESS in the repeated game.
Leon A. Petrosyan, Xiuxiu Liu
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A Survey on Entropy and Economic Behaviour
Entropy plays a significant role in the study of games and economic behaviour in several ways. A decision maker faced with an n-fold repetition of a decision-making problem needs to apply strategies that become increasingly complex as n increases.
Ziv Hellman, Ron Peretz
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Learning in a Hiring Logic and Optimal Contracts
This paper examines a hiring logic problem in which all players involved in this game are exposed to scenarios where they can learn from the changes and these modifications influence their preferences; consequently, their decision-making differs from the
Jose Iranildo Sales +1 more
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In a two-stage repeated classical game of prisoners' dilemma the knowledge that both players will defect in the second stage makes the players to defect in the first stage as well.
A. Iqbal +7 more
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A Game Theoretic Framework for Quality of Experience Enhancement in Dense Stadia
In crowded venues, such as sports stadia, maintaining an acceptable network quality of experience (QoE) is hard to achieve. Installing small cells, distributed antenna systems or high-density WiFi in every stadium is too expensive for mobile network ...
Mohammed S. Bahbahani, Emad Alsusa
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