Results 11 to 20 of about 2,218,614 (254)
Evaluationwise strategy-proofness [PDF]
Games and Economic Behavior, 2017 zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Erdamar, Bora +2 more
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STRATEGY-PROOF JUDGMENT AGGREGATION [PDF]
Economics and Philosophy, 2007 Which rules for aggregating judgments on logically connected propositions are manipulable and which not? In this paper, we introduce a preference-free concept of non-manipulability and contrast it with a preference-theoretic concept of strategy-proofness. We characterize all non-manipulable and all strategy-proof judgment aggregation rules and prove an
Franz Dietrich, Christian List
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The relation between monotonicity and strategy-proofness [PDF]
Social Choice and Welfare, 2011 zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Bettina Klaus, Olivier Bochet
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Strategy-proof coalition formation [PDF]
International Journal of Game Theory, 2009 We analyze coalition formation problems in which a group of agents is partitioned into coalitions and agents' preferences only depend on the coalition they belong to. We study rules that associate to each profile of agents' preferences a partition of the society.
Carmelo Rodríguez-álvarez +1 more
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Robust group strategy‐proofness [PDF]
Theoretical Economics, 2021 Strategy‐proofness (SP) is a sought‐after property in social choice functions because it ensures that agents have no incentive to misrepresent their private information at both the interim and ex post stages. Group strategy‐proofness (GSP), however, is a notion that is applied to the ex post stage but not to the interim stage.
Kivinen, Steven, Tumennasan, Norovsambuu
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Strategy-proofness and single-crossing [PDF]
Theoretical Economics, 2007 This paper analyzes strategy-proof collective choice rules when individuals have single-crossing preferences on a finite and ordered set of social alternatives. It shows that a social choice rule is anonymous, unanimous, and strategy-proof on a maximal single-crossing domain if and only if it is an extended median rule with n-1 fixed ballots ...
Alejandro Saporiti
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Strictly strategy-proof auctions [PDF]
Mathematical Social Sciences, 2020 A strictly strategy-proof mechanism is one that asks agents to use strictly dominant strategies. In the canonical one-dimensional mechanism design setting with private values, we show that strict strategy-proofness is equivalent to strict monotonicity plus the envelope formula, echoing a well-known characterisation of (weak) strategy-proofness.
Matteo Escudé, Ludvig Sinander
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Parameterization of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in the Obnoxious Facility Game
Journal of Graph Algorithms and Applications, 2017 In the obnoxious facility game, a location for an undesirable facility is to be determined based on votes cast by selfish agents. The design of group strategy proof mechanisms has been extensively studied, and it is known that choosing a facility ...
Morito Oomine +2 more
doaj +1 more source
Pairwise Strategy-Proofness and Self-Enforcing Manipulation [PDF]
, 2005 "Strategy-proofness" is one of the axioms that are most frequently used in the recent literature on social choice theory. It requires that by misrepresenting his preferences, no agent can manipulate the outcome of the social choice rule in his favor. The
Shigehiro Serizawa
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Obvious Strategy-Proofness with Respect to a Partition [PDF]
We define and study obvious strategy-proofness with respect to a partition of the set of agents. It encompasses strategy-proofness as a special case when the partition is the coarsest one and obvious strategy-proofness when the partition is the finest. For any partition, it falls between these two extremes.
Arribillaga, R. Pablo +2 more
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