Results 21 to 30 of about 2,218,614 (254)
Strategy-proofness and markets [PDF]
Social Choice and Welfare, 2001 zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
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Strategy‐proof and group strategy‐proof stable mechanisms: An equivalence
International Journal of Economic Theory, 2019 AbstractWe prove that group strategy‐proofness and strategy‐proofness are equivalent requirements on stable mechanisms in priority‐based resource allocation problems with multi‐unit demand. The result extends to the model with contracts.
Romero Medina, Antonio, Triossi, Matteo
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Strategy-Proofness of Stochastic Assignment Mechanisms
Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, 2018 This paper seeks to identify which algorithm to employ in a situation where goods are distributed to individuals without using money, while treating everyone equally and respecting each individual's preferences.
André Schmelzer
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Strategy‐proof size improvement: is it possible?* [PDF]
The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2023 AbstractThe number of assigned agents (i.e., size) is an important parameter in object allocations. While size maximality clashes with individual rationality and strategy‐proofness, it can still be possible to increase the size over a mechanism while keeping these properties. To pursue this research, we devise a size comparison criterion to investigate
Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz, Dur, Umut Mert
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Strategy-Proof Compromises [PDF]
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2011 We study strategy-proof decision rules in the variant of the canonical public good model proposed by Borgers and Postl (2009). In this setup, we fully characterize the set of budget-balanced strategy-proof deterministic mechanisms, which are simple threshold rules. For smooth probabilistic mechanisms, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for
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CoRR, 2019 We study the plausibility of sub-optimal Nash equilibria of the direct revelation mechanism associated with a strategy-proof social choice function. By using the recently introduced empirical equilibrium analysis (Velez and Brown, 2019, arXiv:1804.07986) we determine that this behavior is plausible only when the social choice function violates a non ...
Rodrigo A. Velez, Alexander L. Brown
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Strategy-Proof Package Assignment [PDF]
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2014 We examine the strategy-proof allocation of multiple divisible and indivisible resources; an application is the assignment of packages of tasks, workloads, and compensations among the members of an organization. We find that any allocation mechanism obtained by maximizing a separably concave function over a polyhedral extension of the set of Pareto ...
Erlanson, Albin, Szwagrzak, Karol
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Strategy-proof stochastic assignment [PDF]
Journal of Economic Theory, 2014 I study strategy-proof assignment mechanisms where the agents reveal their preference rankings over the available objects. A stochastic mechanism returns lotteries over deterministic assignments, and mechanisms are compared according to first-order stochastic dominance.
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Strategy-proof popular mechanisms
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2022 We consider the allocation of indivisible objects when agents have preferences over their own allocations, but share the ownership of the resources to be distributed. Examples might include seats in public schools, faculty offices, and time slots in public tennis courts.
Mustafa Oğuz Afacan, Inácio Bó
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Assigning doctors to mandatory service hospitals: a strategy-proof approach
Central Bank ReviewI analyze the mechanism used to assign medical doctors to mandatory service positions in Türkiye. To address staffing gaps in underserved areas, the government requires newly graduated, specialized, or subspecialized doctors to work in designated ...
Günnur Ege Bilgin
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