Results 31 to 40 of about 2,218,614 (254)
Strategy-Proof Allotment Rules [PDF]
Games and Economic Behavior, 1997 zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Barberà, Salvador +2 more
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The Strategy-Proofness Landscape of Merging
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 2007 Merging operators aim at defining the beliefs/goals of a group of agents from the beliefs/goals of each member of the group. Whenever an agent of the group has preferences over the possible results of the merging process (i.e., the possible merged bases), she can try to rig the merging process by lying on her true beliefs/goals if this leads to better ...
Everaere, Patricia +2 more
openaire +4 more sources
Strategy-proof Cardinal Decision Schemes [PDF]
Social Choice and Welfare, 2006 zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Peters, H.J.M., Bhaskar, D., Sen, A.
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Therapeutic Apheresis and Dialysis, EarlyView.ABSTRACT Background Chronic micro‐inflammation in patients with end‐stage renal disease (ESRD) is a significant driver of cardiovascular complications and diminished quality of life. While standard hemodialysis (SHD) effectively manages small‐molecule clearance, its ability to remove medium‐to‐large uremic toxins—the primary catalysts of systemic ...
Hongwei Zuo +5 more
wiley +1 more source
Strategy-Proof Mechanism Design with Boundedly Rational Agents: Theory and Experiment
GamesIn a strategy-proof mechanism, implementation theory mostly assumes that each agent is rational in the sense that the agent reveals its true preference to induce its most preferred outcome.
Katsuhiko Nishizaki
doaj +1 more source
On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness [PDF]
Games and Economic Behavior, 2011 We characterize the class of strategy-proof social choice functions on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences. This class is strictly larger than the set of generalized median voter schemes (the class of strategy-proof and tops-only social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences characterized by Moulin (1980)) since ...
Jordi Massó, Inés Moreno de Barreda
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Report-dependent utility and strategy-proofness [PDF]
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2021 Despite the truthful dominant strategy, participants in strategy-proof mechanisms submit manipulated preferences. In our model, participants dislike rejections and enjoy the confirmation from getting what they declare desirable. Formally, the payoff from a match decreases in its position in the submitted ranking such that a strategic trade-off between
openaire +2 more sources
Organoids in pediatric cancer research
FEBS Letters, EarlyView.Organoid technology has revolutionized cancer research, yet its application in pediatric oncology remains limited. Recent advances have enabled the development of pediatric tumor organoids, offering new insights into disease biology, treatment response, and interactions with the tumor microenvironment.
Carla Ríos Arceo, Jarno Drost
wiley +1 more source
Strategy-proof coalition formation. [PDF]
We analyze coalition formation problems in which a group of agents is partitioned into coalitions and agents' preferences only depend on the coalition they belong to. We study rules that associate to each profile of agents' preferences a partition of the
Rodríguez Álvarez, Carmelo
core +6 more sources
MathematicsFinding a fair and efficient multi-resource allocation is a fundamental goal in cloud computing systems. In this paper, we consider the problem of multi-resource allocation with a bounded number of tasks. We propose a lexicographic max–min maximin share (
Jie Li +3 more
doaj +1 more source