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Efficiency and resilience of cooperation in asymmetric social dilemmas. [PDF]
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S AHübner V +4 more
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Subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes in continuous games of almost perfect information
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2000The author studies a continuous dynamic game \((H_{\infty}, u)\) of almost perfect information defined by the following: There are \(n\) players taking part in the game. At moment \(t=0\) the game starts with a point \(y_0\) from a starting set. Next, in each period \(t=1,2, \ldots\) each player \(i\) chooses independently an action \(y_t^i\), and then
Thomas Mariotti
exaly +3 more sources
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium Analysis for Jamming Attacks on Resilient Graphs
2019 American Control Conference (ACC), 2019A cyber security problem is considered in a networked system formulated as a resilient graph problem based on a game theoretic approach. The connectivity of the underlying graph of the network system is reduced by an attacker who removes some of the edges whereas the defender attempts to recover them.
Yurid Nugraha +2 more
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Nash Equilibrium and Subgame Perfection in Observable Queues
Annals of Operations Research, 2002zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Refael Hassin, Moshe Haviv
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Computing a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of a Sequential Matching Game
Proceedings of the 2018 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2018We study a decentralized matching market in which each firm sequentially makes offers to potential workers. For each offer, the worker can choose "accept" or "reject," but the decision is irrevocable. The acceptance of an offer guarantees her job at the firm, but it may also eliminate chances of better offers from other firms in the future.
Yasushi Kawase +2 more
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An Evolutionary Model of Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
2023Classical game theory begins with the assumption that its agents are rational, and proceeds to find various solution concepts from these premises. These solution concepts are often interpreted as the rational way to behave in games. However, this method often faces normative (and empirical) concerns on the validity of its rationality assumptions.
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Step-by-Step: The Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium
2020In a sequential game, subgame perfectness selects equilibria such that players choose mutually best replies not only at the beginning of the game but also in every subgame. Consequentially, neither player has an incentive to deviate from the chosen equilibrium strategy in the course of the game.
Manfred J. Holler, Barbara Klose-Ullmann
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Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of Repeated Games with Implementation Costs
Journal of Economic Theory, 1995zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Neme, Alejandro, Quintas, Luis
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On the existence of subgame-perfect equilibrium in infinite-action games of perfect information
Journal of Economic Theory, 1987We study infinite-action games of perfect information with finitely or countably many players. It is assumed that payoff functions are continuous, strategy sets are compact, and constraint correspondences are continuous. Under these assumptions we prove the existence of subgame- perfect equilibria in pure strategies which are measurable functions.
Hellwig, Martin, Leininger, Wolfgang
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