Alternating-Offers Bargaining with Nash Bargaining Fairness Concerns [PDF]
Behavioral Sciences, 2023 The Rubinstein alternating-offers bargaining game is reconsidered, where players show fairness concerns and their fairness references are characterized by the Nash bargaining solution.
Zhongwei Feng, Fangning Li, Chunqiao Tan
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On (Subgame Perfect) Secure Equilibrium in Quantitative Reachability Games [PDF]
Logical Methods in Computer Science, 2013 We study turn-based quantitative multiplayer non zero-sum games played on finite graphs with reachability objectives. In such games, each player aims at reaching his own goal set of states as soon as possible.
Thomas Brihaye +3 more
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On non-cooperative foundation and implementation of the Nash solution in subgame perfect equilibrium via Rubinstein's game [PDF]
Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, 2016 In this paper we provide an exact non-cooperative foundation of the Nash solution via a unique (weakly) subgame perfect equilibrium payoff vector in a two-person bargaining game, which is a modification of the well-known alternate offer game by ...
Papatya Duman, Walter Trockel
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Fuzzy-Based Privacy-Preserving Scheme of Low Consumption and High Effectiveness for IoTs: A Repeated Game Model [PDF]
Sensors, 2022 In the Internet of things (IoTs), data transmission via network coding is highly vulnerable to intra-generation and inter-generation pollution attacks. To mitigate such attacks, some resource-intensive privacy-preserving schemes have been adopted in the ...
Laicheng Cao, Min Zhu
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The evolution of morality and the role of commitment [PDF]
Evolutionary Human Sciences, 2021 A considerable share of the literature on the evolution of human cooperation considers the question why we have not evolved to play the Nash equilibrium in prisoners’ dilemmas or public goods games.
Aslihan Akdeniz, Matthijs van Veelen
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A notion of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under knightian uncertainty [PDF]
, 2000 We define a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty for two players, by means of a recursive backward induction procedure. We prove an extension of the Zermelo-von Neumann-Kuhn Theorem for games of perfect information, i. e., that the recursive procedure generates a Nash equilibrium under uncertainty (Dow and Werlang(1994)) of the ...
Werlang, Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa
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Delay to Deal: Bargaining with Indivisibility and Round-Dependent Transfer
Games, 2023 We examine a bargaining game in which players cannot make arbitrary offers. Instead, players alternately decide whether to accept or delay, and are rewarded with an indivisible portion and a perishable transfer that depends on the round.
Jijian Fan
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Network Externalities and Downstream Collusion under Asymmetric Costs: A Note
Games, 2023 This paper considers the collusive stability of downstream competition in a vertical market with network externalities and cost asymmetry. A dynamic collusion game is constructed, and backward induction is employed to solve the subgame perfect Nash ...
Jen-Yao Lee +2 more
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Optimal Segmentation over a Generalized Customer Distribution
Axioms, 2021 This paper investigates the impact of consumer preferences on the intensity of competition for companies in a duopoly market. A classical Hotelling’s competition problem will be different if consumers are allowed to distribute non-uniformly.
Tsung-Yin Ou, Yenming J. Chen
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Constrained Existence Problem for Weak Subgame Perfect Equilibria with ω-Regular Boolean Objectives [PDF]
Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science, 2018 We study multiplayer turn-based games played on a finite directed graph such that each player aims at satisfying an omega-regular Boolean objective. Instead of the well-known notions of Nash equilibrium (NE) and subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE), we ...
Thomas Brihaye +3 more
doaj +1 more source