Implementation of the Walrasian Correspondence: The Boundary Problem [PDF]
Consider exchange economies in which preferences are continuous, convex and strongly monotonic. It is well known that the Walrasian correspondence is not Nash implementable.
Bochet,Olivier
core +1 more source
Social Networks and Crime Decisions: The Role of Social Structure in Facilitating Delinquent Behavior [PDF]
, 2003 We develop a model in which delinquents compete with each other in criminal activities but may benefit from being friends with other criminals by learning and acquiring proper know-how on the crime business. By taking the social network connecting agents
Calvó-Armengol, Antoni, Zenou, Yves
core
Endogenous timing game with non-monotonic reaction functions [PDF]
The aim of this paper is to generalize the endogenous timing game proposed by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) to cases where the reaction functions are non-motononic, as for instance in the literature on contest.
Grégoire ROTA-GRAZIOSI, Magnus HOFFMANN
core
Transfers, Contracts and Strategic Games [PDF]
This paper analyses the role of transfer payments and strategic con- tracting within two-person strategic form games with monetary pay- offs. First, it introduces the notion of transfer equilibrium as a strat- egy combination for which individual ...
Borm, P.E.M. +4 more
core +1 more source
Optimal strategy of the simultaneous dice game Pig for multiplayers: when reinforcement learning meets game theory. [PDF]
Sci Rep, 2023 Zhu T, Ma M, Chen L, Liu Z.
europepmc +1 more source
Private Peering Among Internet Backbone Providers [PDF]
We develop a model, in which Internet backbone providers decide on private peering agreements, comparing the benefits of private peering relative to being connected only through National Access Points. Backbone providers compete by setting capacities for
Narine Badasyan, Subhadip Chakrabarti
core
Emergence of specialized third-party enforcement. [PDF]
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A, 2023 Mohlin E, Rigos A, Weidenholzer S.
europepmc +1 more source
Coalition-Stable Equilibria in Repeated Games [PDF]
It is well-known that subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium does not eliminate incentives for joint-deviations or renegotiations. This paper presents a systematic framework for studying non-cooperative games with group incentives, and offers a notion of ...
Anthony Fai-Tong Chung
core
General Framework for the Optimization of the Human-Robot Collaboration Decision-Making Process Through the Ability to Change Performance Metrics. [PDF]
Front Robot AI, 2021 Hani Daniel Zakaria M +3 more
europepmc +1 more source
Enumerating rights: more is not always better. [PDF]
Public Choice, 2023 Ball S, Dave C, Dodds S.
europepmc +1 more source