Results 81 to 90 of about 1,223 (172)
Student of Games: A unified learning algorithm for both perfect and imperfect information games. [PDF]
Schmid M +12 more
europepmc +1 more source
Two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in small object division markets
Haake C-J. Two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in small object division markets. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics. Vol 366.
Haake, Claus-Jochen
core
Noncooperative oligopoly in markets with a continuum of traders [PDF]
In this paper, we study three prototypical models of noncooperative oligopoly in markets with a continuum of traders : the model of Cournot-Walras equilibrium of Codognato and Gabszewicz (1991), the model of Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Lloyd S.
Busetto, Francesca +2 more
core
International markets are extremely polarised, with a few big superstar businesses operating alongside numerous small competitors, and globalisation has been highlighted as a powerful force behind the superstars’ increasingly dominant presence.
Chara Vavoura
doaj +1 more source
The present paper examines the effect of R&D spillovers on regional innovation in Greece over the 2002-2010 period. The approach taken goes beyond a regional knowledge production function and draws possible explanations from a more extensive pool of R&D related and regional structural variables.
openaire +2 more sources
Two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in small object division markets [PDF]
We discuss two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution in the context of an object division problem involving two agents. Allocations of objects resulting from strategic interaction are obtained as a demand vector in a specific ...
Claus-Jochen Haake
core
Endogenous timing in three-player Tullock contests. [PDF]
Baik KH, Lee JH, Lee S.
europepmc +1 more source
A Notion of Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium under Knightian Uncertainty
. We define a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty for two players, by means of a recursive backward induction procedure. We prove an extension of the Zermelo-von Neumann-Kuhn Theorem for games of perfect information, i.
Sérgio Ribeiro, Costa Werlang
core
A Cellular Market Model for Social Welfare Maximization Through a Subsidization Scheme
In cellular communications markets, various stakeholders interact while considering regulatory policies enacted by governments to maximize social welfare.
Carlos Agualimpia-Arriaga +5 more
doaj +1 more source
A notion of subgame perfect nash equilibrium under knightian uncertainty
We define a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty for two players, by means of a recursive backward induction procedure. We prove an extension of the Zermelo-von Neumann-Kuhn Theorem for games of perfect information, i.
Werlang, Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa
core

