Results 61 to 70 of about 1,224 (172)
Quantitative Economics, Volume 17, Issue 3, Page 827-857, July 2026.The theory of infinitely repeated games may lack predictive power due to its insensitivity to, for example, changes in some game parameters, the timing of players' moves, and communication possibilities. We propose a new approach by studying an infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game and its variants where preferences for cooperation are ...
Melis Kartal, Wieland Müller
wiley +1 more source
Acyclicity of Preferences, Nash Equilibria, and Subgame Perfect Equilibria: a Formal and Constructive Equivalence [PDF]
, 2007 In 1953, Kuhn showed that every sequential game has a Nash equilibrium by showing that a procedure, named ``backward induction'' in game theory, yields a Nash equilibrium.
Le Roux, Stéphane
core +7 more sources
Theoretical Economics, Volume 21, Issue 3, Page 849-887, July 2026.We investigate the management of information provision to maximize user engagement. A principal sequentially reveals signals to an agent who has a limited amount of information processing capacity and can choose to exit at any time. We identify a “dilution” strategy—sending rare but highly informative signals—that maximizes user engagement.
Benjamin Hébert, Weijie Zhong
wiley +1 more source
Efficient investment, search, and sorting in matching markets
Theoretical Economics, Volume 21, Issue 3, Page 810-848, July 2026.We study markets where heterogeneous agents first make investment decisions and then engage in a costly search to form productive matches. The trading process is a random search and bargaining with explicit search costs. Despite potential hold‐up and matching problems, we prove that the constrained efficient allocation is an equilibrium: the agents ...
Alp Atakan, Michael Richter, Matan Tsur
wiley +1 more source
Two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in small object division markets [PDF]
, 2005 Haake C-J. Two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in small object division markets. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics. Vol 366.
Haake, Claus-Jochen
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The RAND Journal of Economics, Volume 57, Issue 2, Page 334-348, Summer 2026.ABSTRACT We study a long‐horizon, oligopolistic market with random shocks to demand that can be arbitraged by two storage operators with finite capacity. This problem applies to any storable commodity—that is, most commodities. Because the arbitrage spread is so sensitive to market power, storage operators face strong incentives to restrain quantities ...
Sergei Balakin, Guillaume Roger
wiley +1 more source
Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games [PDF]
We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for observed outcomes in extensive game forms, in which preferences are unobserved, to be rationalized first, partially, as a Nash equilibrium and then, fully, as the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium. Thus,
Indrajit Ray, Susan Snyder
core
Why Is Exclusivity in Broadcasting Rights Prevalent and Why Does Simple Regulation Fail?
The RAND Journal of Economics, Volume 57, Issue 2, Page 402-419, Summer 2026.ABSTRACT Pay‐TV firms compete both downstream to attract viewers and upstream to acquire broadcasting rights. Because profits inherited from downstream competition satisfy a convexity property, allocating rights to the dominant firm maximizes the industry profit.
David Martimort, Jerome Pouyet
wiley +1 more source
Driver’s lane selection model based on multi-player dynamic game
Advances in Mechanical Engineering, 2019 With a view to the background of Internet of Things, the vehicle group situation, especially the propensity of different drivers, and the corresponding vehicle types were given a comprehensive consideration on the basis of the factors which influence ...
Xiao-yuan Wang +5 more
doaj +1 more source
Selection methods for subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in a continuous setting [PDF]
, 2018 This thesis is focused on the issue of selection of Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) in the class of one-leader N-follower two-stage games where the players have a continuum of actions. We are mainly interested in selection methods satisfying the following significant features in the theory of equilibrium selection for such a class of games ...
openaire +1 more source