Results 71 to 80 of about 1,223 (172)
, 2006 The theory of implementation abounds with mechanisms with intricate systems of rewards and punishments off-the-equilibrium path. Generally, it is not in the designer’s best interest to go through with the reward/punishment in the “subgame” arising from ...
Luis C. Corchón +5 more
core +1 more source
Service competition in two-tier healthcare markets with heterogeneous patients balking
Journal of Management Science and EngineeringRecently, public and private providers within two-tier healthcare markets have engaged in a fierce competition for patients, which is significantly influenced by patients' multifaceted sensitivities to delays and payments, particularly when patients ...
Yuanbing Miao +4 more
doaj +1 more source
Selection methods for subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in a continuous setting [PDF]
, 2018 This thesis is focused on the issue of selection of Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) in the class of one-leader N-follower two-stage games where the players have a continuum of actions. We are mainly interested in selection methods satisfying the following significant features in the theory of equilibrium selection for such a class of games ...
openaire +1 more source
Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium in stochastic differential games as solution of a generalized Euler Equations System [PDF]
This paper gives a new method to characterize Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium in stochastic differential games by means of a set of Generalized Euler Equations.
Ricardo Josa-Fombellida +1 more
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Cournot-Walras equilibrium as a subgame perfect equilibrium [PDF]
In this paper, we investigate the problem of the strategic foundation of the Cournot-Walras equilibrium approach. To this end, we respecify à la Cournot-Walras the mixed version of a model of simultaneous, noncooperative exchange, originally proposed by
Busetto, Francesca +2 more
core
Implementation in Mixed Nash Equilibrium [PDF]
A mechanism implements a social choice correspondence f in mixed Nash equilibrium if at any preference profile, the set of all pure and mixed Nash equilibrium outcomes coincides with the set of f-optimal alternatives at that preference profile.
Claudio Mezzetti, Ludovic Renou
core
, 2007 In 1953, Kuhn showed that every sequential game has a Nash equilibrium by showing that a procedure, named ``backward induction'' in game theory, yields a Nash equilibrium.
Le Roux, Stéphane
core +3 more sources
On Games of Perfect Information: Equilibria, E-Equilibria and Approximation by Simple Games [PDF]
We show that every bounded, continuous at infinity game of perfect information has an "!perfect equilibrium. Our method consists of approximating the payoff function of each player by a sequence of simple functions, and to consider the corresponding ...
Carmona, Guilherme
core
Observable implications of nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games [PDF]
, 2003 In this paper we develop tests for whether play in a game is consistent with equilibrium behavior when preferences are unobserved. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for observed outcomes in extensive game forms to be rationalized first ...
Snyder, Susan, Ray, Indrajit
core
A Subsidization Scheme for Maximizing Social Welfare in Mobile Communications Markets
SystemsIn contemporary mobile communications markets, various agents or players interact to pursue welfare. Regulatory policies enacted by governments in certain markets aim to maximize social welfare.
Carlos Agualimpia-Arriaga +4 more
doaj +1 more source