Results 51 to 60 of about 1,223 (172)

Extensive-form games and strategic complementarities [PDF]

open access: yes
(less than 25 lines) I prove the subgame-perfect equivalent of the basic result for Nash equilibria in normal-form games of strategic complements: the set of subgame-perfect equilibria is a non-empty, complete lattice.
Federico Echenique
core   +2 more sources

Storage games

open access: yesThe RAND Journal of Economics, Volume 57, Issue 2, Page 334-348, Summer 2026.
ABSTRACT We study a long‐horizon, oligopolistic market with random shocks to demand that can be arbitraged by two storage operators with finite capacity. This problem applies to any storable commodity—that is, most commodities. Because the arbitrage spread is so sensitive to market power, storage operators face strong incentives to restrain quantities ...
Sergei Balakin, Guillaume Roger
wiley   +1 more source

Why Is Exclusivity in Broadcasting Rights Prevalent and Why Does Simple Regulation Fail?

open access: yesThe RAND Journal of Economics, Volume 57, Issue 2, Page 402-419, Summer 2026.
ABSTRACT Pay‐TV firms compete both downstream to attract viewers and upstream to acquire broadcasting rights. Because profits inherited from downstream competition satisfy a convexity property, allocating rights to the dominant firm maximizes the industry profit.
David Martimort, Jerome Pouyet
wiley   +1 more source

Subgame perfect equilibrium: matchmaking and strategic investments [Game theory]

open access: yes, 2016
Educação Superior::Ciências Sociais Aplicadas::EconomiaPresents a class that analyzes some games using a new solution concept created by the Professor and students, subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE).
Polak, Ben
core   +1 more source

Addressing Daigou from the Perspective of Channel Competition: Strategy for Retail Management

open access: yesMathematics
In China’s on-demand service platforms, daigou agents utilize locational differences through proxy purchasing. Daigou creates an informal supply chain that directly competes with official channels.
Keqin Chang   +2 more
doaj   +1 more source

A Game Theoretic Framework for Quality of Experience Enhancement in Dense Stadia

open access: yesIEEE Access, 2019
In crowded venues, such as sports stadia, maintaining an acceptable network quality of experience (QoE) is hard to achieve. Installing small cells, distributed antenna systems or high-density WiFi in every stadium is too expensive for mobile network ...
Mohammed S. Bahbahani, Emad Alsusa
doaj   +1 more source

Cross‐border reciprocal bartering in public–private tetradic networks

open access: yesDecision Sciences, Volume 57, Issue 3, Page 213-234, June 2026.
Abstract Under the background of semiconductor and vaccine shortages during COVID‐19‐driven supply chain disruptions, this article adopts a multimethodological approach to investigate strategic solutions for cross‐border scarce goods bartering in a public–private (P–P) tetradic reciprocal network, which involves two pairs of P–P collaborative dyads ...
Jiuh‐Biing Sheu   +2 more
wiley   +1 more source

Three essays on game theory [PDF]

open access: yes, 2007
The main text of this thesis is divided into three chapters. The three papers are contributions to the literature on equilibrium refinements in noncooperative game theory. Each chapter can be read independently of the rest.
González Pimienta, Carlos
core  

The Voting Premium

open access: yesThe Journal of Finance, Volume 81, Issue 3, Page 1321-1375, June 2026.
ABSTRACT We develop a unified theory of blockholder governance and the voting premium in a setting without takeovers or controlling shareholders. A voting premium emerges when a minority blockholder can influence shareholder composition by accumulating votes and buying shares from dissenting shareholders.
DORON LEVIT, NADYA MALENKO, ERNST MAUG
wiley   +1 more source

Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium [PDF]

open access: yes, 2009
A mechanism implements a social choice correspondence f in mixed Nash equilibrium if at any preference profile, the set of all pure and mixed Nash equilibrium outcomes coincides with the set of f-optimal alternatives at that preference profile.
Mezzetti, Claudio   +3 more
core  

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