Results 21 to 30 of about 13,525 (178)

Endogenous timing in a vertically differentiated mixed duopoly with Cournot competition

open access: yesArchives of Control Sciences, 2016
This paper compares the equilibrium outcomes under simultaneous and sequential output setting in a mixed duopoly in a vertically differentiated market. When the timing of the output game is determined endogenously, it is shown that simultaneous play in ...
Feng Leidong, Gu Mengdi
doaj   +1 more source

FogCom:SDN-enabled fog node selection for early detection of communicable diseases

open access: yesJournal of King Saud University: Computer and Information Sciences, 2023
A communicable illness is one that spreads from person to person by a number of means, including contact with blood and body fluids, inhaling an airborne virus, or being bitten by an insect.
Joy Lal Sarkar   +8 more
doaj   +1 more source

Economic Harmony—A Rational Theory of Fairness and Cooperation in Strategic Interactions

open access: yesGames, 2022
Experimental studies show that the Nash equilibrium and its refinements are poor predictors of behavior in non-cooperative strategic games. Cooperation models, such as ERC and inequality aversion, yield superior predictions compared to the standard game ...
Ramzi Suleiman
doaj   +1 more source

Optimal Portfolio Selection of Mean-Variance Utility with Stochastic Interest Rate

open access: yesJournal of Function Spaces, 2020
In order to tackle the problem of how investors in financial markets allocate wealth to stochastic interest rate governed by a nested stochastic differential equations (SDEs), this paper employs the Nash equilibrium theory of the subgame perfect ...
Shuang Li   +4 more
doaj   +1 more source

Invitation Games: An Experimental Approach to Coalition Formation

open access: yesGames, 2021
This paper studies how to form an efficient coalition—a group of people. More specifically, we compare two mechanisms for forming a coalition by running a laboratory experiment and reveal which mechanism leads to higher social surplus. In one setting, we
Takaaki Abe   +2 more
doaj   +1 more source

Subgame Perfect Equilibrium in the Rubinstein Bargaining Game with Loss Aversion

open access: yesComplexity, 2019
Rubinstein bargaining game is extended to incorporate loss aversion, where the initial reference points are not zero. Under the assumption that the highest rejected proposal of the opponent last periods is regarded as the associated reference point, we ...
Zhongwei Feng, Chunqiao Tan
doaj   +1 more source

Two-Player Location Game in a Closed-Loop Market with Quantity Competition

open access: yesComplexity, 2020
This paper considers the two-player location game in a closed-loop market with quantity competition. Based on the Cournot and Hotelling models, a circle model is established for a closed-loop market in which two players (firms) play a location game under
Xiaofeng Chen   +2 more
doaj   +1 more source

Dynamics and Coalitions in Sequential Games [PDF]

open access: yesElectronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science, 2017
We consider N-player non-zero sum games played on finite trees (i.e., sequential games), in which the players have the right to repeatedly update their respective strategies (for instance, to improve the outcome wrt to the current strategy profile). This
Thomas Brihaye   +3 more
doaj   +1 more source

Stackelberg games-based distributed algorithm of pricing and resource allocation in heterogeneous wireless networks

open access: yesTongxin xuebao, 2013
To deal with resource allocation in heterogeneous wireless networks,an algorithm based on multi-leader multi-follower Stackelberg games model was proposed to satisfy optimal utility of both operators and mobile users.The mobile user’s utility function ...
Yong JIANG, Shan-zhi CHEN, Bo HU
doaj   +2 more sources

BACKWARD INDUCTION: MERITS AND FLAWS

open access: yesStudies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric, 2017
Backward induction (BI) was one of the earliest methods developed for solving finite sequential games with perfect information. It proved to be especially useful in the context of Tom Schelling’s ideas of credible versus incredible threats.
Kamiński Marek M.
doaj   +1 more source

Home - About - Disclaimer - Privacy