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Unanimous subjective probabilities

Economic Theory, 2006
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K. BORDER, GHIRARDATO, Paolo, U. SEGAL
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Are Subjective Probabilities Probabilities?

1974
While it certainly has proved expedient to describe people’s behavior in terms of probabilities, it is not clear whether, to what extent, or under what conditions, it is admissable to identify actual behavior with some reasonably well-fitting probabilistic description of it. What the authors call the confusion problem arises where such admissibility is
Gerard de Zeeuw, Willem A. Wagenaar
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UPDATING SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITY

Journal of the American Statistical Association, 1982
Abstract Jeffrey's rule for revising a probability P to a new probability P* based on new probabilities P* (Ei ) on a partition {Ei } i = 1 n is P*(A) = Σ P(A| Ei ) P* (Ei ). Jeffrey's rule is applicable if it is judged that P* (A | Ei ) = P(A | Ei ) for all A and i. This article discusses some of the mathematical properties of this rule, connecting it
Persi Diaconis, Sandy L. Zabell
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ON SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITY REVISION

British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology, 1972
A simple one‐parameter model is proposed for the behaviour of conservative subjects in a probability revision task. The model exhibits several features of experimental data, makes specific predictions and provides a useful norm in a somewhat confused and inconsistent area of research.
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Subjective probability

Choice Reviews Online, 1995
Eric R. Ziegel, G. Wright, P. Ayton
  +9 more sources

Elicitation of Subjective Probabilities When the Initial Endowment Is Unobservable

Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 1999
International audienceIn the framework of subjective expected utility theory we develop two distinct procedures for the elicitation of a person's subjective probabilities when the initial endowment is random and unobservable. Procedures of the first kind
Jean-Yves Jaffray, Edi Karni
exaly   +2 more sources

Subjective probability and indifference

Analysis, 1983
This axiom is read: If it is not the case that p is epistemically preferable to q, and it is not the case that q is epistemically preferable to r, then it is not the case that p is epistemically preferable to r. Peter Millican has pointed out that my argument against (A2) is unsound if epistemic preferability is given a probabilistic interpretation ...
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Subjective Probabilities

2006
exaly   +2 more sources