Results 1 to 10 of about 780 (158)
Bayesian Persuasion in Sequential Trials [PDF]
, 2021 This is a camera-ready version of the 17th conference on web and internet economics (WINE 2021)
Shih-Tang Su +2 more
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Algorithmic Bayesian persuasion [PDF]
SIAM Journal on Computing, 2016 Persuasion, defined as the act of exploiting an informational advantage in order to effect the decisions of others, is ubiquitous. Indeed, persuasive communication has been estimated to account for almost a third of all economic activity in the US. This paper examines persuasion through a computational lens, focusing on what is perhaps the most basic ...
Shaddin Dughmi, Haifeng Xu
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Bayesian Explanations for Persuasion
Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2022 The central puzzle of persuasion is why a receiver would listen to a sender who they know is trying to change their beliefs or behavior. This article summarizes five approaches to solving this puzzle: (1) some messages are easier to send for those with favorable information ( costly signaling), (2) the sender and receiver have common interest, (3) the
Andrew T. Little
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Regret-minimizing Bayesian persuasion [PDF]
Games and Economic Behavior, 2022 We study a Bayesian persuasion setting with binary actions (adopt and reject) for Receiver. We examine the following question - how well can Sender perform, in terms of persuading Receiver to adopt, when ignorant of Receiver's utility? We take a robust (adversarial) approach to study this problem; that is, our goal is to design signaling schemes for ...
Yakov Babichenko +3 more
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Bayesian Persuasion with Costly Information Acquisition [PDF]
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2018 We consider a Bayesian persuasion model, in which the receiver can gather independent information about the state at a uniformly posterior-separable cost. We show that the sender provides information that prevents the receiver from gathering independent information in equilibrium.
Ludmila Matysková
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Conflict Prevention by Bayesian Persuasion [PDF]
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2019 AbstractDrawing upon the Bayesian persuasion literature, I show that a mediator can provide conflicting parties strategically with information to decrease the ex‐ante war probability. In a conflict between two parties with private information about military strength, the mediator generates information about each conflicting party's strength and commits
Raphaela Hennigs
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, 2021 This dissertation mainly focuses on situations in which a sender (e.g. an incumbent party) communicates with multiple receivers (e.g. voters) in order to persuade them to vote in favour of a proposal. We focus on the sender’s perspective and analyse how the sender can increase the probability of implementing the proposal.
Toygar T. Kerman
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Public Bayesian Persuasion: Being Almost Optimal and Almost Persuasive
Algorithmica, 2020 AbstractWe study algorithmic Bayesian persuasion problems in which the principal (a.k.a. the sender) has to persuade multiple agents (a.k.a. receivers) by using public communication channels. Specifically, our model follows the multi-receiver model with no inter-agent externalities introduced by Arieli and Babichenko (J Econ Theory 182:185–217, 2019 ...
Matteo Castiglioni +2 more
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Perfect Bayesian Persuasion [PDF]
A sender commits to an experiment to persuade a receiver. Accounting for the sender's experiment-choice incentives, and not presupposing a receiver tie-breaking rule when indifferent, we characterize when the sender's equilibrium payoff is unique and so coincides with her "Bayesian persuasion" value.
Elliot Lipnowski +2 more
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