Results 11 to 20 of about 13,242 (292)
Conflict prevention by Bayesian persuasion [PDF]
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2021 AbstractDrawing upon the Bayesian persuasion literature, I show that a mediator can provide conflicting parties strategically with information to decrease the ex‐ante war probability. In a conflict between two parties with private information about military strength, the mediator generates information about each conflicting party's strength and commits
Raphaela Hennigs
openalex +4 more sources
Public Bayesian Persuasion: Being Almost Optimal and Almost Persuasive [PDF]
Algorithmica, 2023 AbstractWe study algorithmic Bayesian persuasion problems in which the principal (a.k.a. the sender) has to persuade multiple agents (a.k.a. receivers) by using public communication channels. Specifically, our model follows the multi-receiver model with no inter-agent externalities introduced by Arieli and Babichenko (J Econ Theory 182:185–217, 2019 ...
Matteo Castiglioni +2 more
openalex +5 more sources
Bayesian Explanations for Persuasion
Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2022 The central puzzle of persuasion is why a receiver would listen to a sender who they know is trying to change their beliefs or behavior. This article summarizes five approaches to solving this puzzle: (1) some messages are easier to send for those with favorable information ( costly signaling), (2) the sender and receiver have common interest, (3) the
Andrew T. Little
openalex +5 more sources
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2016 zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko
openalex +2 more sources
Bayesian persuasion in unlinked games [PDF]
International Journal of Game Theory, 2021 AbstractOriginating from Kamenica and Gentzkow (Am Econ Rev 101(6):2590–2615, 2011), we analyze multi-receiver Bayesian persuasion games with heterogeneous beliefs without strategic interactions among receivers, which we call unlinked. We show that given the receivers’ best-responses, the sender’s rationalizable strategies are obtained from a single ...
Makoto Shimoji
openalex +5 more sources
Verbalized Bayesian Persuasion [PDF]
Information design (ID) explores how a sender influence the optimal behavior of receivers to achieve specific objectives. While ID originates from everyday human communication, existing game-theoretic and machine learning methods often model information structures as numbers, which limits many applications to toy games.
Wenhao Li +5 more
openalex +3 more sources
The Core of Bayesian Persuasion [PDF]
Proceedings of the 25th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2023 An analyst observes the frequency with which an agent takes actions, but not the frequency with which she takes actions conditional on a payoff relevant state. In this setting, we ask when the analyst can rationalize the agent's choices as the outcome of the agent learning something about the state before taking action. Our characterization marries the
Laura Doval, Ran Eilat
openalex +3 more sources
Regret-minimizing Bayesian persuasion [PDF]
Games and Economic Behavior, 2021 We study a Bayesian persuasion setting with binary actions (adopt and reject) for Receiver. We examine the following question - how well can Sender perform, in terms of persuading Receiver to adopt, when ignorant of Receiver's utility? We take a robust (adversarial) approach to study this problem; that is, our goal is to design signaling schemes for ...
Yakov Babichenko +3 more
openaire +3 more sources
BAYESIAN PERSUASION WITH PRIVATE EXPERIMENTATION [PDF]
International Economic Review, 2017 This article studies a situation in which a sender tries to persuade a receiver by providing hard evidence that is generated by sequential private experimentation where the sender can design the properties of each experiment contingent on the experimentation history. The sender can selectively reveal as many outcomes as desired. We determine the set of
Mike Felgenhauer, Petra Loerke
openalex +5 more sources