Results 11 to 20 of about 12,634 (289)
Who is Afraid of Bayesian Persuasion? [PDF]
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2018 Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow 2011) refers to the optimal signalling of a Sender with informational advantage over the Receiver, under the constraint that the expected posterior (over the state space) equals the common prior. In the basic example of a judicial system with a prosecutor (Sender) and a judge (Receiver) who needs to convict or
Luc Lauwers, Patrick J. G. Van Cayseele
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Multi-Channel Bayesian Persuasion
, 2021 The celebrated Bayesian persuasion model considers strategic communication between an informed agent (the sender) and uninformed decision makers (the receivers). The current rapidly-growing literature mostly assumes a dichotomy: either the sender is powerful enough to communicate separately with each receiver (a.k.a.
Yakov Babichenko +3 more
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Verbalized Bayesian Persuasion [PDF]
Information design (ID) explores how a sender influence the optimal behavior of receivers to achieve specific objectives. While ID originates from everyday human communication, existing game-theoretic and machine learning methods often model information structures as numbers, which limits many applications to toy games.
Wenhao Li +5 more
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Bayesian Persuasion in Sequential Decision-Making
Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2022 We study a dynamic model of Bayesian persuasion in sequential decision-making settings. An informed principal observes an external parameter of the world and advises an uninformed agent about actions to take over time. The agent takes actions in each time step based on the current state, the principal's advice/signal, and beliefs about the external ...
Jiarui Gan +3 more
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Bayesian Persuasion with Mediators
, 2022 An informed sender communicates with an uninformed receiver through a sequence of uninformed mediators; agents' utilities depend on receiver's action and the state. For any number of mediators, the sender's optimal value is characterized. For one mediator, the characterization has a geometric meaning of constrained concavification of sender's utility ...
Itai Arieli +2 more
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Differentially Private Bayesian Persuasion [PDF]
Proceedings of the ACM on Web Conference 2025The tension between persuasion and privacy preservation is common in real-world settings. Online platforms should protect the privacy of web users whose data they collect, even as they seek to disclose information about these data to selling advertising spaces.
Yuqi Pan +3 more
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PENDEKATAN REGRESI LOGISTIK BAYES PADA PEMODELAN PERILAKU IBU TERHADAP KEBERSIHAN MULUT ANAK BALITA
E-Jurnal Matematika, 2022 Human behavior is a set of behaviors that humans have that are influenced by customs, value, ethics, attitudes, emotion, power, persuasion, and/or genetics. Oral hygiene is a form of dental hygiene. Toddler often suffer from oral and dental problems such
KASTIN DWILEN PONG SUMAE +2 more
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Opinion dynamics with confirmation bias. [PDF]
PLoS ONE, 2014 Confirmation bias is the tendency to acquire or evaluate new information in a way that is consistent with one's preexisting beliefs. It is omnipresent in psychology, economics, and even scientific practices.
Armen E Allahverdyan, Aram Galstyan
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Bayesian Persuasive Driving [PDF]
2019 American Control Conference (ACC), 2019 In the autonomous driving area, interaction between vehicles is still a piece of puzzle which has not been fully resolved. The ability to intelligently and safely interact with other vehicles can not only improve self driving quality but also be beneficial to the global driving environment.
Masayoshi Tomizuka, Cheng Peng
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Bayesian Persuasion with Lie Detection [PDF]
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2020 We consider a model of Bayesian persuasion in which the Receiver can detect lies with positive probability. We show that the Sender lies more when the lie detection probability increases. As long as the lie detection probability is sufficiently small the Sender's and the Receiver's equilibrium payoffs are unaffected by the lie detection technology ...
Weicheng Min +2 more
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