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SSRN Electronic Journal, 2022
Traditional economic theory of collusion assumed that cartels are inherently unstable, and yet some manage to operate for years or even decades. While the literature has presented several determinants of cartel stability, the vast majority focuses on firms as entities, even though cartels are typically formed between individuals who need to develop ...
Haucap, Justus, Heldman, Christina
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Traditional economic theory of collusion assumed that cartels are inherently unstable, and yet some manage to operate for years or even decades. While the literature has presented several determinants of cartel stability, the vast majority focuses on firms as entities, even though cartels are typically formed between individuals who need to develop ...
Haucap, Justus, Heldman, Christina
openaire +3 more sources
International Economic Review, 1986
We define a notion of cartel stability which allows firms to recognize the impact of their actions on the overall market structure. We demonstrate that in an industry with identical firms, linear marginal cost and linear demand conditions, a stable cartel always exists. We determine the characteristics of stable cartels, such as uniqueness and size.
Donsimoni, Marie-Paule +2 more
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We define a notion of cartel stability which allows firms to recognize the impact of their actions on the overall market structure. We demonstrate that in an industry with identical firms, linear marginal cost and linear demand conditions, a stable cartel always exists. We determine the characteristics of stable cartels, such as uniqueness and size.
Donsimoni, Marie-Paule +2 more
openaire +2 more sources
Journal of Regulatory Economics, 1993
This paper formalizes and studies the argument of cartelization of industries through captured agencies. An agency can affect entry by a producer of a differentiated commodity in the market of a regulated natural monopoly through the manipulation of information it produces about the benefit of entry.
Laffont, Jean-Jacques, Tirole, Jean
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This paper formalizes and studies the argument of cartelization of industries through captured agencies. An agency can affect entry by a producer of a differentiated commodity in the market of a regulated natural monopoly through the manipulation of information it produces about the benefit of entry.
Laffont, Jean-Jacques, Tirole, Jean
openaire +3 more sources