Results 211 to 220 of about 1,704 (241)
Some of the next articles are maybe not open access.
2015
Abstract The chapter discusses the constituent elements of a cartel, which are agreements or concerted practices between competitors aimed at certain restrictions of competition by object, such as price fixing or market sharing. It then turns to two interrelated topics, namely the burden and standard of proof in cartel investigations ...
Filip Tuytschaever +1 more
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Abstract The chapter discusses the constituent elements of a cartel, which are agreements or concerted practices between competitors aimed at certain restrictions of competition by object, such as price fixing or market sharing. It then turns to two interrelated topics, namely the burden and standard of proof in cartel investigations ...
Filip Tuytschaever +1 more
openaire +1 more source
2021
We study the relationship between collusion and corruption in a stylized model of repeated procurement where the cost of reporting corrupt bureaucrats gives rise to a free riding problem. Cooperation among honest suppliers alleviates free-riding in reporting.
Burguet, Roberto +2 more
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We study the relationship between collusion and corruption in a stylized model of repeated procurement where the cost of reporting corrupt bureaucrats gives rise to a free riding problem. Cooperation among honest suppliers alleviates free-riding in reporting.
Burguet, Roberto +2 more
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German Cartels and Cartel-Like Organizations
2013This chapter focuses on cartels and cartel-like organizations in Nazi Germany. The report explains German industrial organization is dominated by large vertical combines. Cartels and other associations of business, a common fixture of the German economy, have been used by the combines as means for the domination of industry and are
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CAREER DEVELOPMENT AFTER CARTEL PROSECUTION: CARTEL VERSUS NON-CARTEL MANAGERS
Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 2012I examine the career development of managers after they have been subjected to cartel prosecution by the Netherlands Competition Authority (NMa). A representative function is used as an indicator for a career outcome after prosecution. I compare the career development of Dutch managers involved in a cartel with that of a control group of Dutch managers
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In reviewing the theoretical and empirical literature on collusion, this paper distills methods for detecting cartels and distinguishing collusion from competition.
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Simulation and prosecution of a cartel with endogenous cartel formation [PDF]
In many cases, collusive agreements are formed by asymmetric firms and include only a subset of the firms active in the cartelized industry. This paper endogenizes the process of cartel formation in a numeric simulation model where firms differ in marginal costs and production technologies.
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Cartel Penalties Under Endogenous Detection
Review of Industrial Organization, 2022Douglas C Turner
exaly
Cartels in Action and Cartels or Competition
Journal of Marketing, 1949Hugh E. Agnew +2 more
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